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Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with the relation between attention and demonstrative 
thought. It focuses on John Campbell’s view of this relation which he defends 
in his book Reference and Consciousness and some other work. Campbell’s view 
is that conscious perceptual attention to an object explains how we are able to 
think perceptual demonstrative thoughts about that object. I will label this view 
‘Campbell’s Thesis’. The main aim of this thesis is to assess Campbell’s Thesis 
by identifying the issues upon which the question of whether we should accept 
or reject it turns, and by revealing some of the commitments that must be taken 
on by those who wish to reject it. The first main claim of this thesis is that 
Campbell’s own arguments for his thesis are not entirely successful (largely 
because of his reliance on his notion of ‘knowledge of reference’). The second 
main claim is whether we should accept or reject Campbell’s Thesis really turns 
upon: (i) whether conscious perceptual attention is a unified psychological 
phenomena (I’ll argue there is a strong argument for Campbell’s thesis if this is 
so); (ii) whether it is acceptable to deny conscious perceptual experience of 
objects has an explanatory role with respect to our capacities to think 
perceptual demonstrative thoughts about objects (I’ll argue those who reject 
Campbell’s Thesis are committed to denying this). I won’t claim to have settled 
the question of whether we should accept or reject Campbell’s Thesis here. 
However I will claim to have clarified the issues upon which this question turns 
and revealed some of the commitments that must be taken on by those who 
wish to reject Campbell’s Thesis. 
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This thesis is concerned with the relation between attention and demonstrative 
thought. It is often claimed that attention explains how we are able to think 
demonstrative thoughts about objects and that it is required for such thought. 1 
My aim in this thesis is to assess a version of this claim. My focus will be on 
John Campbell’s version of this claim which he puts forward and defends in his 
book Reference and Consciousness and some other work.2  The specific claim of 
Campbell’s that I will focus on here is that conscious attention to an object 
explains how we are able to think perceptual demonstrative thoughts about that 
object, and that conscious attention to an object is an essential part of this 
explanatory story, such that it is necessary for perceptual demonstrative 
thought about that object. For example, Campbell writes: 
Conscious attention to an object has an explanatory role to play: it has to 
explain how it is that we have knowledge of reference … This means that 
conscious attention to an object must be thought of as more primitive than 
thought about the object. It is a state more primitive than thought about an 
object, to which we can appeal in explaining how it is that we can think about 
the thing (2002: 45).  
There is the level of conceptual thought about your surroundings. [And] 
There is the level of conscious attention to your surroundings, which is more 
primitive than the level of conceptual thought, and which explains your 
capacity for conceptual thought by providing you with knowledge of 
reference. [C]onscious attention to an object … is a state more primitive than 
thought about the object, which nonetheless, by bringing the object itself into 
                                                      
1 Versions of this claim have recently been endorsed and employed in discussions of the nature 
of conscious attention (Campbell 2002: 2, 45, 96-97; Stazicker 2011a, 2011b: chapter 6; Watzl 
2011b; Wu 2011a); discussions of the nature of demonstrative thought (Campbell 2002: 84-113; 
Dickie 2011; Levine 2010; Smithies 2011a, 2011b); and discussions of perceptual epistemology 
(Campbell 201, Roessler 2011). 
2 See Campbell 1997, 2004, 2006, 2011. Note the position in Campbell’s 1997 is somewhat 
different to his position in his 2002 and later work. I focus on the later position here. 
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the subjective life of the thinker, makes it possible to think about that object. 
(2002: 5-6). 
Suppose … that you and I are sitting side by side looking at a cityscape, a 
panorama of buildings. If I am to think about any one of those buildings, if I 
am to formulate conjectures or questions about any of those buildings, if I am 
to be able to refer to any one of those buildings in my own thoughts, it is not 
enough that the building should simply be there, somewhere or other in my 
field of view. If it is simply there in my field of view, though unnoticed by me, 
I am not yet in a position to refer to it; I cannot yet think about it. If I am to 
think about it, I have to single out the building visually: I have to attend to it. 
(2002: 2).3 
How should we understand Campbell’s claim more precisely? There are at least 
three sets of issues we need to explore here. We need to ask: (1) What exactly 
does Campbell mean by conscious attention? (2) Exactly which kinds of 
thought about objects is Campbell’s explanatory claim supposed to apply to? 
What does it mean to say the claim is supposed to apply to demonstrative 
thoughts, or to perceptual demonstrative thoughts? (3) How and why, in a bit 
more detail, is conscious attention supposed to explain such thought about 
objects? What does Campbell mean by ‘knowledge of reference’ in the 
quotations above? I’ll try to give an answer to these questions in §§2-4. With 
these exegetical points in hand I will then go on, in §5, to discuss the main aims 
and claims and the strategy of this thesis. 
2. Conscious attention 
Our first task is to try to determine what Campbell means by ‘conscious 
attention’. It’s important to note that Campbell uses the term to pick out 
something that is supposed to be familiar to his readers, as an aspect of their 
everyday phenomenology, or through their introspective reflection. It is 
supposed to be part of our commonsense psychology, such that we all know 
how to deploy conscious attention and readily give psychological explanations 
and make psychological attributions in terms of it. Campbell often talks of 
                                                      
3 There are similar examples and claims scattered throughout Campbell’s 2002. Also see 
Campbell 1997: 55-58ff.; 2004: 266-270; 2006: 246-250.   
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conscious attention as the ‘experiential highlighting’ of objects and sometimes 
even uses ‘conscious attention’ and ‘experiential highlighting’ interchangeably. 
He also says that when one consciously attends to an object one separates the 
object visually, as figure from ground, and one visually discriminates it from its 
surroundings (2002: 25). I suggest that Campbell’s use of the term conscious 
attention suggests that, if a form of attention is to count as conscious attention 
then it must meet two conditions or be conscious in two ways. Any instance of 
conscious attention must involve both: (a) conscious experience of the objects 
of attention; (b) conscious selection of the objects of attention (one must single 
out, separate, discriminate, highlight etc. the object of attention). In fact, 
Campbell always talks of conscious attention as something we do (albeit 
perhaps not always voluntarily), rather than something that merely happens to 
us. He also makes clear that the notion of attention he is employing doesn’t 
require one to overtly move one’s eyes, head or body, but can involve some 
covert, purely psychological act of selection (2002: 9). But beyond these basic 
points, Campbell doesn’t tell us a great deal about the nature of conscious 
attention. We might suggest Campbell hopes that, as William James famously 
put it, “Everyone knows what attention is…” (1890: 381).4 
Now we should agree that there’s certainly an extent to which we do all know 
what attention is, and an extent to which conscious attention in Campbell’s 
sense really is phenomenologically and introspectively familiar, and part of our 
commonsense psychology. But I suggest there is also room to question how 
unified, precise or clear this commonsense or ordinary notion of conscious 
attention really is. For example we can note that lots of metaphors seem to 
attach themselves to our ordinary understanding of attention. As Campbell 
likes to stress, conscious attention seems to involve our ‘highlighting’ objects in 
                                                      
4 For some recent philosophical work on this kind of attention, often much impressed by this 
quotation from James, see the papers collected in Mole, Smithies and Wu 2011, as well as Mole 
2010, Stazicker 2011, Watzl 2010, Wu 2011a. For a very different take on conscious attention, 
see O’Shaughnessy 2000 (esp. chapters 2, 7-9, 14). I’ll discuss the views of these philosophers in 
a bit in chapter 2, §4.  
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our experience. It also seems to involve a kind of ‘mental pointing’ towards or a 
‘focusing of the mind’ on objects. It can be natural to talk of conscious 
attention as something we move like a beam or spotlight, illuminating this 
object then that (see Martin 1997). But these metaphors can be somewhat 
problematic. It can be unclear exactly what they pick out and how we should 
understand them; it can be unclear there is any one, unified, explanatorily and 
psychologically significant thing that they describe. I’ll develop this kind of 
point much more in chapter 2, §4. But for now let us note there may be 
question marks over precisely which aspect of mind Campbell’s notion of 
conscious attention picks out, and whether Campbell always picks out one and 
the same thing whenever he writes of conscious attention. 
It’s going to be important to note that Campbell’s notion of conscious attention 
is qualified with ‘conscious’ so as to clearly distinguish it from some other 
kinds or notions of attention. In particular, it’s qualified in this way to 
distinguish it from some of the notions of attention employed in empirical 
psychology and neuroscience. In these fields attention is usually understood as 
the selection of information for further processing, with the term ‘attention’ 
used to refer to the mechanisms that facilitate or control this selection. In 
recent work Campbell is generally careful to distinguish conscious attention, in 
his sense, from these other kinds  or notions of attention. For example he 
writes:  
It is attention as a phenomenon of consciousness that matters [here] … The 
kind of attention needed here is, as it were, a matter of experiential 
highlighting of the object; it is not enough merely that there be some shifts in 
the architecture of my information-processing machinery (2002: 2).  
Spatial attention in Treisman's sense involves the singling out of a single 
location on the master map of locations, so that all features at the selected 
location can be bound together as features of a single thing. There is no very 
evident reason to think that spatial attention in this sense must be a 
phenomenon of consciousness … The kind of low-level exercise of attention 
that Treisman's model argues is required for binding, contrasts with the kind 
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of exercise of conscious attention that I am arguing is required for knowledge 
of reference (2002: 31).5 
Now we might reasonably think there must be some interesting relations 
between the attentional mechanisms studied by psychologists and conscious 
attention. After all, many (but not all) of the experiments these scientists use to 
study such attentional mechanisms involve manipulating something we might 
recognise as conscious attention. But I want to stress we should be careful not 
to identify or confuse the kind of conscious attention Campbell is interested in 
with attention as the selection of information for further processing (or with 
the mechanisms that facilitate or control this selection). We should also be 
careful not to assume any particular account of the relation between these 
notions or kinds of attention without some careful argument; I want to stress it 
is an open and difficult question how, and to what extent, these two notions or 
kinds of attention are related.6 
It’s also going to be important to note that conscious attention in Campbell’s 
sense is not the only thing we could legitimately call conscious attention. It 
should be clear by now that Campbell is only interested in perceptual forms of 
conscious attention, which involves our selecting objects in perceptual 
experience. But there is also a perfectly legitimate sense in which we can 
consciously attend to objects simply by consciously thinking of them. Consider 
the following from M.G.F. Martin: 
                                                      
5 Campbell is making this point because he frames some of his discussion of these issues 
around Anne Treisman’s Feature Integration Theory of attention (see, e.g., Treisman and 
Gelade 1980), which is a theory that concerns subpersonal information-processing mechanisms.   
6 One implication of this is we should be careful about importing some of the distinctions 
psychologists make (regarding attentional mechanisms) into our discussions of conscious 
attention. For example psychologists distinguish between exogenous and endogenous; transient 
and sustained; divided and selective; object-based, spatial and feature-based; top-down and 
bottom-up forms of attention (see, e.g., Pashler 1998; Palmer 1999: chapter 11; Chun et al. 
2011). I suggest it’s unclear whether all these distinctions can be straightforwardly applied to 
conscious attention. 
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What are the most obvious generalisations about attention and thought 
that form part of the manifest image of these aspects of mind? When I 
think about the level of subsidy for arable land in the Common 
Agricultural Policy, I thereby attend to European farming policy. In 
general, whatever we are prepared to call an object of thought—be it the 
things thought about, what one thinks about them, or the proposition 
one thinks in thinking these things—we can also take to be an object of 
attention. Conscious, active thought is simply a mode of attending to the 
subject matter of such thoughts … [I]f we think of thoughts as 
determinations of attention, then there can be no way of thinking of 
something without thereby to some extent to be attending to it. (1997: 77-
78; also see Martin 1998: 101-104ff.). 
Now it should be clear Campbell’s explanatory claim could not be taken to 
concern this kind of conscious attention. To consciously attend to an object in 
this sense is just to think about that object. So, presumably, this kind of 
conscious attention could not be taken to explain how some of our most basic 
kinds of thought about objects—e.g., according to Campbell, perceptual 
demonstrative thought—is possible, and cannot be required for such thought 
(in any non-trivial sense). For this reason it will be important to distinguish 
conscious attention in Campbell’s sense (what I’ll call conscious perceptual 
attention, although Campbell himself doesn’t make this qualification) from the 
kind of conscious attention Martin describes.7 In fact there may be further 
kinds of conscious attention that are distinct from the kind of conscious 
perceptual attention Campbell is interested in. For example, Christopher 
Peacocke (1998: 68-69) and Brian O’Shaughnessy (2000: 275-277) argue we can 
consciously attend to our own actions—or rather, as they’d put it, our actions 
can occupy our attention—where such attending cannot be identified with and 
is not reducible to any form of perceptual attention. Whether or not this point 
is correct, the important point for our purposes is that Campbell’s explanatory 
claim should be understood to concern only conscious perceptual attention; 
that is, the conscious selection of the objects of perceptual experience. Actually, 
                                                      
7 However in chapter 2, §§3-4 I will discuss in detail whether or not it’s right to think conscious 
attention in thought and conscious perceptual attention are really significantly different kinds 
of attention. 
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more accurately, Campbell’s discussion is almost entirely focused on visual 
perception and conscious visual attention. In this thesis I will also focus 
discussion entirely on vision. However, for ease of exposition, I’ll follow 
Campbell and others by talking of ‘perception’ (especially ‘conscious perceptual 
attention’ and ‘perceptual demonstrative thought’) in an unqualified way.8  
3. Perceptual demonstrative thought 
The next question we need to ask with respect to Campbell’s explanatory claim 
is: Exactly which kinds of thought is the claim supposed to apply to? That is to 
say: Exactly which kinds of thought does Campbell think are explained by and 
made possible by conscious perceptual attention? The short answer to this 
question is: only perceptual demonstrative thought. In this section I aim to give 
an account of what perceptual demonstrative thought is, explain how it differs 
from other kinds of thought, and indicate why Campbell’s explanatory claim is 
only supposed to apply to this kind of thought. 9 
We can start by noting Campbell’s explanatory claim is only supposed to apply 
to thoughts that are about or refer to particular objects. One way to expand on 
this idea is to say Campbell’s explanatory claim is only supposed to apply to 
thoughts with contents whose truth or falsity turn on how things are with some 
particular object (or some particular objects). So it is only supposed to apply to 
thoughts with contents we could express with sentences containing some 
singular referring terms. For example: 
                                                      
8 It would actually be extremely interesting to discuss whether Campbell’s explanatory claim 
applies to auditory attention, and what the differences between vision and audition are in this 
regard. But I regret I won’t be able to consider these issues in this thesis. 
9 For classic discussion of this kind of perceptually grounded thought, which stresses its 
fundamental importance and basicness, see Evans 1982: chapter 6; Moore 1918; Strawson 1959: 
chapter 1. Campbell himself doesn’t offer us a particularly detailed characterization of what 
perceptual demonstrative thought is. What he does say is that: “[perceptual] demonstrative 
reference [is] reference made to a currently perceived object on the basis of current perception 
of it” (2002: 2). The characterization I offer here basically just expands on this idea.  
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(1) Kaplan is a philosopher.  
(2) That person is a philosopher. 
We can contrast such referential thoughts with thoughts with only general or 
quantificational content. That is to say, thoughts with contents we could 
express with sentences such as: 
(3) Some spy is a philosopher. 
(4) Every spy is a philosopher. 
Campbell’s explanatory claim is not supposed to apply to this kind of general 
thought. But why think we have two significantly different kinds of thought 
here? One reason is that there is an important contrast between sentences such 
as (1)-(2) and sentences such as (3)-(4), which express the contents of our two 
kinds of thought. As I just mentioned, the truth or falsity of (1)-(2) turns on 
how things are with some particular object. For example, (1) is true when the 
predicate ‘…is a philosopher’ applies to the referent of the proper name 
‘Kaplan’ and false when it does not. But (3)-(4) seem to be importantly 
different in this regard. (3) is true when the predicate ‘…is a philosopher’ 
applies to some spy or at least one spy (it doesn’t matter which), and false if the 
predicate ‘…is a philosopher’ applies to no spy. And (4) is true when the 
predicate ‘…is a philosopher’ applies to every spy, and false if the predicate 
‘…is a philosopher’ fails to apply to at least one spy (it doesn’t matter which). 
In this way (3)-(4) have an element of generality that is absent in (1)-(2), and 
(1)-(2) have an element of particularity that is absent in (3)-(4). We could point 
to another difference between our two pairs of sentences: they behave 
differently under wide-scope and narrow-scope negation. For example the 
following sentences seem to be equivalent:  
(5) It’s not the case that Kaplan is a philosopher.  
(6) Kaplan is not a philosopher. 
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But compare: 
(7) It’s not the case that some spy is a philosopher. 
(8) Some spy is not a philosopher. 
If David Kaplan (a philosopher) is a spy and George Smiley (a spy) is not a 
philosopher, then (8) is true and (7) is false. So (7) and (8) are clearly not 
equivalent. These simple observations, which reveal significant semantic 
differences between the contents of our two kinds of thought, will probably 
reassure us that we really do have two significantly different kinds of thought 
here, with Campbell’s explanatory claim applying only to the referential kind.10 
Next we can ask: Is Campbell’s explanatory claim supposed to apply to any 
referential thought? Clearly not. If it were, then it would be open to immediate 
counterexamples. For example, plausibly I can think thoughts that are about or 
refer to the philosopher David Kaplan, since I know something about his life, 
have engaged with his work, and since I can recognise his writing style and 
name (etc.). However, as far as I know I have never consciously perceptually 
attended to Kaplan. Indeed, as far as I know, I have never even seen a 
                                                      
10 One problem with this brief discussion is that it leaves unclear how we should treat thoughts 
with contents we would express using definite descriptions. For example: 
(9) The shortest spy in England is a philosopher. 
Whether we treat such thoughts as of the same kind as thoughts with contents expressed by 
(1)-(2) will partly turn on some tricky issues about whether definite descriptions should be 
analyzed as having quantificational form (e.g. with (9) as ∃x [(F(x) ∧ ∀y  (F(y) → x = y)) ∧ 
G(x)]), or whether we should think definite descriptions can sometimes act as singular 
referring terms. (For the relevant arguments compare, e.g., Russell 1905, 1919; Evans 1982: 
51ff.; Kripke 1977; Neale 1990 with Strawson 1950; Donnellan 1966; Millican 1990—for a 
helpful overview of the debate see Ludlow 2011). This will also partly turn on whether we 
should hold the thoughts with contents expressed by (1)-(2) are fundamentally of a kind that 
have object-dependent content (i.e. a content that is about a particular object, such that any 
thought episode which has that content could only occur given the existence of that particular 
object (see, e.g., Evans 1982: esp. 71ff. and McDowell 1982: esp. 402ff.; cf. discussion in Martin 
2002)). If this were so thoughts with contents expressed by (9) may be of a fundamentally 
different kind to thoughts with contents expressed by (1)-(2), since the content expressed by (9) 
doesn’t seem to be object-dependent in this way. But settling these issues in any definite way 
would take us too far afield here: Campbell’s explanatory claim certainly isn’t supposed to 
apply to thoughts with such descriptive content. 
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photograph of him or heard a recording of his voice. As such, conscious 
perceptual attention to Kaplan clearly does not explain how I am able to think 
about him, and conscious perceptual attention to Kaplan is clearly not required 
for me to think about him.11 
In light of this we might think Campbell’s explanatory claim is supposed to 
apply to any referential thought about objects in one’s visual field, such that 
those objects figure in or make a difference to one’s visual experience. But this 
doesn’t seem quite right either. For example we might imagine I am standing in 
the viewing gallery at the top of Tower Bridge in London. It seems perfectly 
possible that I could think about St. Paul’s Cathedral, without having recently 
consciously perceptually attended to St. Paul’s, even when its dome is there in 
my field of view, figuring in or making a difference to my visual experience. As 
long as I know a bit about St. Paul’s and have the ability to recognise it (say), 
then I might well have a standing capacity to think about St. Paul’s that I can 
exercise at any time, wherever I am. And there seems to be no reason to say I 
could not exercise this standing capacity while standing at the top of Tower 
Bridge, with the dome of St. Paul’s figuring in my visual experience, unnoticed 
and unattended. So in this case, conscious perceptual attention to St. Paul’s 
may well play no role in explaining how I am able to think about it. Of course it 
could be my standing capacity to think about St. Paul’s in part depends on my 
having consciously perceptually attended to it in the past, but it needn’t do so. 
Plausibly I might have such a standing capacity even if I have never laid eyes on 
St. Paul’s and have never even seen a photograph of it (perhaps I have just read 
a lot about it). So it’s not true in every case that conscious perceptual attention 
                                                      
11 It might be objected that conscious perceptual attention could explain how I am able to think 
these thoughts in some more indirect way. For example, my conscious perceptual attention to 
the text of Kaplan’s papers and the role of conscious perceptual attention in concept acquisition 
may be important in explaining how I am able to think such thoughts about Kaplan. But this 
doesn’t seem to be the claim Campbell is interested in. Campbell’s claim is that conscious 
attention to an object explains how thought about that object is possible, on a particular 
occasion. 
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explains how I’m able to think referential thoughts about objects in my visual 
field, nor that it’s required for such thought. 
For these kinds of reasons Campbell’s explanatory claim should not be 
understood as applying to thoughts about objects that merely happen to be in 
one’s field of view. Rather it should be taken to apply only to referential 
thoughts that are, in some sense, based upon or depend upon one’s current 
visual perceptual relation to the objects of thought. To sharpen this idea we can 
point out it’s plausible to think that, in order to think thoughts that are about 
or refer to particular objects, one must have some way of singling out or 
identifying those objects. For example, one must have some means of 
determining and fixing which particular object, out of many, one’s thought is 
about. Now there are several different ways one might do this. In the case of 
Kaplan and St. Paul’s discussed above, I had a standing capacity to single out 
these objects in thought because I had some suitable identificatory knowledge 
of them. I singled out and latched onto them via this identificatory knowledge 
or, as we might put things, via my standing concept of Kaplan or St Paul’s.12 
But note that these kinds of ways of singling out objects for thought are, in 
some senses, quite demanding. One must have had some kind of previous 
encounter with the object (although, as we saw, not necessarily a perceptual 
encounter); one must have suitably stored some of the information gathered 
from this encounter; and one must have already built up a suitable concept of 
the object, involving suitable identificatory knowledge. But in many cases we 
are able to think about objects without doing this kind of preparatory work. We 
are able to single out or identify objects for thought by demonstrating those 
objects in virtue of our bearing some suitable relation to them (e.g. a perceptual 
                                                      
12 It’s very difficult to say exactly what the necessary and sufficient conditions for this kind of 
standing capacity to think about an object are. I don’t want to offer any positive suggestions 
here. For some further discussion cf. Evans 1982 (especially chapters 4, 5, 8); Millikan 2000: 
136-144, 177-192; Recanati 2012.  
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relation). 13 Often we are able to do this on our very first encounter with an 
object, and sometimes on the basis of a very fleeting encounter.14 
Now let us call thought episodes that involve this kind of demonstrative 
identification of objects demonstrative thoughts. So a demonstrative thought is 
a thought episode with a content that is about or refers to at least one particular 
object, such that the subject singles out and latches onto the object of thought 
by demonstratively identifying that object. These are the familiar kind of 
thought episodes with contents we would typically express with ‘That is F’ or 
‘This F is G’, although we should note not every thought episode with a content 
we could express in this way will count as a demonstrative thought. In fact, 
nothing we’ve said so far commits us to the idea that demonstrative thought 
episodes have a distinctive kind of content, or that there is really such a thing as 
a distinctively demonstrative thought content. As we might put it nothing that’s 
been said so far commits us to the idea that:  
[P] For any demonstrative thought episode e with content c: if any 
thought episode e* also has content c, then, necessarily, e* is a 
demonstrative thought episode. 
Plausibly there’s good reason to think that [P] is true, especially if one takes a 
broadly Fregean view of thought content (as Campbell does), according to 
which the way in which one thinks of an object on an occasion will impact the 
                                                      
13 The paradigmatic way of demonstrating an object is to physically point to it. However, when 
we demonstrate an object for the purposes of our own thought (rather than for the purposes of 
communication) this kind of physical pointing is going to be unnecessary and unusual. 
Demonstrative identification in thought presumably involves demonstration in some private, 
psychological, and somewhat metaphorical sense. For classic discussion of demonstration and 
demonstrative identification see Kaplan 1989 and Evans 1982: chapter 6.  
14 None of this should be taken to suggest demonstrating objects in this way is the only 
relatively undemanding way we have of singling out or latching onto objects in thought. 
Perhaps we can do so merely by constructing descriptions that uniquely identify objects (e.g. 
‘The shortest spy in England’). Whether or not this allows us to think referential thoughts 
about objects is controversial, and I want to stay neutral about this here (but see discussion in 
the papers collected in Jeshion 2010).  
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content of one’s thought on that occasion. But the characterization offered here 
allows us, in principle, to stay neutral on this issue.  
Now also notice that we could subdivide types of demonstrative thought 
episodes by the type of relation the subject uses to demonstratively identify 
objects of thought. The standard examples in the literature are perception, 
memory and testimony (see, e.g., Evans 1982: 136ff.), but clearly our focus here 
is going to be on the perceptual case (and more specifically, the visual case). 
According to the characterization I’m offering here, a perceptual demonstrative 
thought is a thought episode with a content that is about or refers to at least 
one particular object, such that the subject singles out and latches onto the 
object of thought by demonstratively identifying that object, on the basis of the 
subject’s perceptual relation to the object. In this sense the subject’s perceptual 
demonstrative thought about an object is based upon and depends upon her 
perceptual relation to the object. It is only this kind of thought that Campbell’s 
explanatory claim is concerned with.  
It is important to note that, according to the characterization offered here, 
perceptual demonstrative thought is a distinctive kind of thought episode, 
which differs from other kinds of thought episodes in virtue of the way in 
which a subject singles out or identifies the object of thought, or, as we might 
put it, the psychological capacities a subject exercises when she does so. So 
nothing that’s been said so far commits us to the idea that perceptual 
demonstrative thought episodes have distinctive thought contents. That is, 
nothing we’ve said so far commits us to: 
[Q] For any perceptual demonstrative thought episode e with content c: 
if any thought episode e* also has content c, then, necessarily, e* is a 
perceptual demonstrative thought episode. 
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Whether or not [Q] holds is something I want to stay neutral about here.15 
To wrap up: In this section I’ve explained which account of perceptual 
demonstrative thought I’m going to operate with in this thesis. Notably it’s an 
account that has quite minimal commitments with respect to how we should 
individuate thought contents: it claims that the distinctive thing about 
perceptual demonstrative thought is the psychological capacities the subject 
exercises on the occasion of thinking, but it remains neutral about whether this 
entails perceptual demonstrative thoughts have a distinctive kind of thought 
content. I suggest we should understand Campbell’s explanatory claim as 
concerning only this kind of thought.  
With these exegetical points in hand, we can now set down a canonical 
formulation of the claim of Campbell’s that I am interested in in this thesis. I’ll 
call the claim ‘Campbell’s Thesis’ (or ‘[CT]’ for short): 
[CT] Conscious perceptual attention to an object explains how we are 
able to think perceptual demonstrative thoughts about that object, and 
conscious perceptual attention to an object is an essential part of this 
explanatory story, such that it is necessary for perceptual demonstrative 
thought about that object. 
4. Knowledge of reference  
Now that we have precisely formulated Campbell’s Thesis we can look in a bit 
more detail at how it is supposed to work and how Campbell tries to argue for 
it. The main idea is that conscious perceptual attention and perceptual 
demonstrative thought are connected by what Campbell calls ‘knowledge of 
reference’. Campbell’s key claim is conscious perceptual attention provides us 
                                                      
15 This will depend on some difficult issues about how we should individuate thought contents 
(e.g. at what fineness of grain) that I don’t want to get into here. But I’ll pick these points up 
again in chapter 2, §4 where I’ll suggest there’s reason to think [Q] is false. Also note that 
accepting [P] need not commit one to [Q].  
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with knowledge of reference when we think perceptual demonstrative thoughts, 
and conscious perceptual attention is the only thing that can do this (see 
Campbell 2002: especially 5-6ff.; 25-26ff.). Now Campbell thinks knowledge of 
reference is necessary for referential thought in general, and thus for perceptual 
demonstrative thought in particular. So it should be clear, in outline, why 
Campbell thinks conscious perceptual attention to an object explains how we 
are able to think perceptual demonstrative thoughts about that object, and why 
he thinks it is an essential part of this explanatory story: it’s the only thing that 
can provide us with the kind of knowledge necessary to think perceptual 
demonstrative thoughts about that object. This, basically, is how [CT] is 
supposed to work and how Campbell tries to argue for it. 
But this quick sketch raises a few questions. First: What does it mean, in more 
detail, to say conscious perceptual attention provides us with knowledge of 
reference. Second: What exactly is knowledge of reference? Why is knowledge 
of reference necessary for referential thought in general, and for perceptual 
demonstrative thought in particular? 
With respect to the first question: I suggest it is not always entirely clear what 
Campbell takes the ‘provides’ relation to be. Campbell certainly seems to think 
conscious perceptual attention to an object explains how we come to have 
knowledge of reference with respect to that object (e.g. 2002: 5, 45, 97). But 
Campbell sometimes seems to think of this explanatory relation as a causal 
relation (e.g., 2002: 13, 34); while at other times he can seem to think of it as a 
constitutive relation (e.g., 2002: 6, 26, 34). Note that [CT] follows easily from 
the idea that conscious perceptual attention (and only this) provides us with 
knowledge of reference, with ‘provides’ understood in either the causal or 
constitutive way. And, actually, it’s not going to matter too much for our 
purposes which way we understand the ‘provides’ relation. 
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What about knowledge of reference itself? What does Campbell tell us about 
this, except that it is necessary for referential thought about objects? Actually I 
want to suggest Campbell operates with and relies on two, not obviously 
equivalent, notions of knowledge of reference when he argues for and 
explicates [CT]. 
The first notion is rather thin, technical and programmatic. Knowledge of 
reference in this sense is given a functional characterization: it is whatever 
causes and justifies (grounds and controls) the pattern of use a subject makes 
with a term or concept; or, as Campbell sometimes puts it: whatever causes and 
justifies the use of the particular procedures for verifying and finding the 
implications of propositions involving a term or concept (see especially 2002: 
21-25).16 One has knowledge of reference as long as something plays this 
causing and justifying (or grounding and controlling) role. One thing to note 
about this characterization of knowledge of reference is that it doesn’t tell us all 
that much about what knowledge of reference actually is (hence I said it’s 
rather ‘thin’). It’s reasonable to think there are lots of different things that could 
potentially play the functional role Campbell uses to characterize knowledge of 
reference, and not all of them things we’d naturally describe as ‘knowledge’. For 
example, perhaps it’s not obvious why certain subpersonal or unconscious 
states could not play this role. On the face of things, the fact that a determinate 
object has been selected by some subpersonal or unconscious system probably 
could cause and justify the pattern of use a subject makes with a term or 
concept, given that, as a result of this selection, the subject’s pattern of use is 
suitably sensitive to how things are with that particular object. Next we should 
ask: Why think knowledge of reference in this sense is necessary for referential 
                                                      
16  Campbell likes to think of ‘the particular procedures for verifying and finding the 
implications of propositions involving a term or concept’ as the introduction and elimination 
rules a subject uses for the term or concept, which (plausibly) determine the pattern of use the 
subject makes with that term or concept. The idea is that knowledge of reference is what causes 
and justifies the subject’s use of one particular set of introduction and elimination rules, rather 
than any other (see 2002: 22-26, 85-86).  
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thought about objects? Campbell doesn’t really tell us, but I think the idea is if 
nothing were causing and justifying the subject’s pattern of use of a term or 
concept, then we’d just have a random, uncontrolled, ungrounded pattern of 
use; one that is not, as it were, properly tied to the object the term or concept 
refers to. The idea is that we’d probably want to say a subject isn’t really 
referring with a term or concept if she lacked knowledge of reference in this 
sense, even if, by some accident, the subject happened to adopt a correct or 
appropriate pattern of use (i.e. every proposition she expressed or thought that 
involved the term or concept were true). Assessing whether these claims are 
fully acceptable would probably require consideration of some truly 
foundational issues in the philosophy of mind and language, but for our 
purposes I’m just going to grant them to Campbell.  
The second notion of knowledge of reference that Campbell operates with and 
relies upon is somewhat more thick, intuitive or full-blooded. Having 
knowledge of reference in this sense is a matter of knowing which object a term 
or concept refers to, in some colloquial or ordinary sense of ‘know which’ (see 
especially 2002: 14ff.; 2004). But, in fact, Campbell doesn’t have much more to 
say about exactly what this kind of knowledge consists in; for example, whether 
it’s propositional or non-propositional, whether it consists in having some 
practical capacity with respect to an object, what the necessary or sufficient 
conditions for it are (etc.). He also doesn’t have much to say about why we 
should think this kind of knowledge-which with respect to an object is really 
necessary for any referential thought about that object (except that he points 
out, in certain cases, it’s very natural to think subjects who clearly lack any 
ordinary form of knowledge-which cannot think referential thoughts about 
objects). Indeed it is actually notoriously difficult to give a precise account of 
what it is to ‘know which item a thought is about’, and thus notoriously 
difficult to argue that this kind of knowledge-which is really necessary for 
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referential thought.17 Campbell himself seems to want to stay as neutral as 
possible on the details here. 
Now when Campbell writes of knowledge of reference it’s not always obvious 
which of the two notions he is appealing to, and it can sometimes seem as if 
Campbell thinks the two notions are basically equivalent. I suspect that, to 
some extent, Campbell takes his thin and technical notion of knowledge of 
reference to be a precisification or formalization of his more intuitive and 
colloquial notion. But I suggest it’s not obvious this move is legitimate and not 
obvious the two notions really could be equivalent. I say this because it’s not 
obvious it’s impossible one could have knowledge of reference in the technical 
sense described above, but nonetheless fail to ‘know which’ object is in question 
in any intuitive, ordinary or colloquial sense.18 I also suggest that some of 
Campbell’s arguments genuinely rely on our understanding knowledge of 
reference in the ordinary or colloquial sense.19 This means we really do have 
two notions of knowledge of reference at play here, and thus must be careful 
not to allow Campbell to switch between different notions in his arguments. 
To wrap up: We’ve seen the basic idea behind [CT] is that conscious perceptual 
attention provides us with knowledge of reference for perceptual demonstrative 
thoughts, where knowledge of reference with respect to an object is necessary 
for any referential thought about that object (including perceptual 
demonstrative thought). However we’ve also seen we should be doubly 
cautious about Campbell’s notion of knowledge of reference since: (a) he seems 
to operate with two non-equivalent notions; (b) one of the notions he relies 
                                                      
17 See Hawthorne and Manley (2012: esp. 71-73ff.) for some recent argument that colloquial 
‘know which’ attributions are much too context-dependent to be of use here (also see, e.g., Boër 
and Lycan 1986, Burge 2010: chapter 6). Even Gareth Evans, who is a major proponent of 
‘knowing which’ requirements on referential thought about objects, admits the condition is 
extremely difficult to make precise (1982: chapter 4, esp. 89-92ff.).  
18 In fact this may seem to be the case in Campbell’s own sea of faces case, which I’ll discuss in 
detail in the next chapter. 
19 Again, see especially the sea of faces argument discussed in detail in chapter 2. 
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upon and argues with—the intuitive, colloquial notion—is not especially clear 
or precise.  
At this point we should note discussion in this introductory chapter reveals 
something important about Campbell’s general strategy in arguing for and 
explicating [CT]. Given the ways in which Campbell characterizes conscious 
perceptual attention and knowledge of reference, we are not going to find 
Campbell arguing for [CT] in any particularly direct manner. For example, we 
are not going to find him arguing for it by providing some detailed account of 
exactly what conscious perceptual attention is, and of exactly what knowledge 
of reference is, and then by explaining, in detail, what it is about the nature of 
conscious perceptual attention that means only it could be what provides us 
with knowledge of reference and explains our capacities for perceptual 
demonstrative thought. Rather, we should expect to find Campbell arguing for 
[CT] only by more indirect means. One way to explain this point is to say there 
is something somewhat schematic or programmatic at the core of [CT]. On one 
way of reading Campbell, his core point is that some primitive and non-
conceptual perceptual faculty explains some of our most basic capacities to 
engage in conceptual thought about objects, and that it does so by causing and 
justifying the patterns of use we make with our most basic concepts of objects 
(what Campbell would consider to be perceptual demonstrative thoughts and 
concepts). Campbell expands on this core point by arguing that conscious 
perceptual attention is the best candidate for a primitive and non-conceptual 
faculty that plays this role. He argues this by highlighting some of the basic 
selective properties of conscious perceptual attention and by ruling out some 
other potentially promising alternatives we might think could play this role (e.g. 
mere perceptual experience of objects and certain unconscious information-
processing mechanisms). Indeed, on one way of reading Campbell, he doesn’t 
actually have a huge amount to say about why conscious perceptual attention, 
in particular, should play this role. In kinds of ways, I suggest, Campbell’s 
 25 
general argumentative strategy is somewhat indirect. These points are 
something we need a firm grip on when we interpret and assess Campbell’s 
arguments for [CT]. 
5. The claims and strategy of this thesis 
The main aim of this thesis is to assess Campbell’s Thesis by identifying the 
issues upon which the question of whether we should accept or reject it turns, 
and by revealing some of the commitments that must be taken on by those who 
wish to reject it. My main strategy will be to evaluate, develop and expand 
Campbell’s own arguments for [CT]. The first main claim of this thesis is that 
Campbell’s own arguments are not entirely successful, largely because of his 
reliance on his notion of ‘knowledge of reference’. The second main claim is 
whether we should accept or reject Campbell’s Thesis really turns upon: (i) 
whether conscious perceptual attention is a unified psychological phenomena 
(I’ll argue Campbell has a strong argument for his thesis if this is so); (ii) 
whether it is acceptable to deny conscious perceptual experience of objects has 
an explanatory role with respect to our capacities to think perceptual 
demonstrative thoughts about objects (I’ll argue those who reject Campbell’s 
Thesis are committed to denying this). 
The plan is as follows: In chapter 2 I reconstruct what I take to be Campbell’s 
main argument for [CT]. I claim this argument is successful only if we make 
some substantive assumptions about the unity of conscious perceptual 
attention (which I’ll suggest will not be easy to defend in any definite way). In 
chapter 3 I consider some of Campbell’s subsidiary arguments for [CT] that do 
not rely on the unity of conscious perceptual attention. I claim these arguments 
are unsuccessful, but I also claim we can develop an alternative and more 
promising argument for [CT], based on some ideas in the background of 
Campbell’s discussions of these issues. The argument claims any position that 
rejects [CT] must also deny conscious perceptual experience of objects explains 
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our capacities for perceptual demonstrative thought. I’ll suggest there are 
various different ways we could develop the argument at this point, but I will 
focus discussion on a version that argues denying conscious perceptual 
experience explains our capacities for perceptual demonstrative thought 
commits one to the idea our commonsense explanations of our capacities to 
think perceptual demonstrative thoughts are confabulations, and also that this 
may lead to scepticism about some of our most basic kinds of non-inferential 
perceptual knowledge. However I’ll suggest that turning this into a complete or 
decisive argument for [CT] would probably require some substantial discussion 
of perceptual epistemology, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
I won’t claim to have settled the question of whether we should accept or reject 
[CT] in this thesis, and won’t claim to have given a decisive or complete 
argument in favour of it. However I will claim to have clarified the issues upon 
which this question turns and to have revealed some of the commitments that 




THE SEA OF FACES ARGUMENT 
1. Introducing the argument 
Campbell’s primary argument for [CT] asks us to compare and contrast some 
imaginary cases in which a subject consciously perceptually attends to an object 
and cases in which a subject does not (or cannot) consciously perceptually 
attend to an object. The most developed and important case of this form is 
Campbell’s ‘sea of faces’ case (see, e.g., 2002: 8-9; 2004: 268-269; 2006: 246-250). 
In the sea of faces case we are to imagine two subjects, H and S, looking out 
over a crowded room of people. S asks H some questions about a particular 
person in the room using the demonstrative expression ‘that woman’. For 
example, S asks H: ‘What’s that woman doing?’ or ‘What’s that woman 
wearing?’. When H inevitably asks S: ‘Which woman do you mean?’ S refuses 
to give H any clues. H doesn’t have any other means of working out who S is 
referring to. H tries singling-out different people in her experience. But she 
doesn’t know if any of them is the woman in question. After a while H gives up 
on this singling-out, and her visual experience becomes as of a ‘sea of faces’. At 
this point S asks H to try to point to the woman S is referring to. Of course H 
will protest she can’t do this since she doesn’t know which woman S is referring 
to. But S insists H tries to guess. When H does try to point, to her surprise she 
is told she is pointing to the right woman. We can give H more abilities with 
respect to the woman in question so that H “can make reliable guesses about 
what the person is eating, wearing, and so on, as well as reaching and pointing 
appropriately” (2002: 8-9).20 But H’s experience remains as of a sea of faces. H 
does not (or cannot) consciously perceptually attend to the woman in question. 
                                                      
20 Presumably we’re supposed to think that some processes or mechanisms in H’s visual system 




so long as H’s conscious experience remains a sea of faces, there is an 
ordinary sense in which H does not know who S means. The problem here 
does not have to do with whether H is reliable: we can suppose that H is 
quite reliable in her guesses and establish this over a series of such cases. The 
point is rather that H does not know who S means until H finally looks at 
where H’s finger is pointing, or looks to see who is wearing the clothes she 
described in her guesses. It is only when H has finally managed to single out 
the woman in her experience of the room … that she would ordinarily be 
said to know who was being referred to. So it does seem to be compelling to 
common sense that conscious attention to the object is needed for an 
understanding of the demonstrative (2002: 9).21 
How might this case be used to argue for [CT]? One thing to note immediately 
is the sea of faces case seems to concern H’s understanding of S’s questions. But 
we’ve seen [CT] is really about the relation between conscious perceptual 
attention and thought about objects, not the relation between conscious 
perceptual attention and understanding the speech of others. No doubt there 
are some interesting and close connections between our abilities to think about 
objects and our abilities to understand speech about objects; but these 
connections may not be straightforward. To avoid this complication I suggest 
we should interpret Campbell as wanting us to think that, as the sea of faces 
case is described, the only way H could work out which woman is in question, 
and thereby understand S’s questions, would be to make a perceptual 
demonstrative identification of the woman in question, and think perceptual 
demonstrative thoughts about her. In other contexts there may well be other 
ways H could come to understand S’s questions, but we’re supposed to think 
this is the only option open to H as the case is described. The main point 
Campbell wants to make with the case is H plausibly lacks the kind of 
knowledge necessary to think this kind of thought about the woman in 
question. It is this, according to Campbell, that prevents H from understanding 
                                                      
21 Campbell describes the case in the first and second person. To make the case easier to discuss 
I have rewritten it with the names H and S. To make the rewritten passage readable I have 
omitted square brackets. 
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S’s questions. As such, we can interpret the sea of faces case to be 
fundamentally about perceptual demonstrative thought. This interpretation 
makes the case more relevant to [CT]. It allows us to avoid getting caught up in 
issues relating to communication and understanding speech, and the relation 
between these things and thought about objects. 
Under this interpretation, Campbell’s main claims about the case are: 
[1] If H doesn’t consciously perceptually attend to the woman then, 
even when H has all these abilities to answer questions and act with 
respect to the woman in question, it is still natural to think H doesn’t 
have the kind of knowledge necessary to think a perceptual 
demonstrative thought about the woman (i.e. what Campbell calls 
‘knowledge of reference’). 
[2] As soon as H does manage to consciously perceptually attend to the 
woman, it seems she will immediately come to have the kind of 
knowledge necessary to think a perceptual demonstrative thought about 
the woman. 
If this is right, then it may seem natural to think conscious perceptual attention 
is making the difference as to whether H has the kind of identificatory 
knowledge necessary to think perceptual demonstrative thoughts about the 
woman in question in the sea of faces case. But, of course, Campbell wants this 
point to generalize beyond the rather bizarre sea of faces case. He intends the 
sea of faces case to make it compelling that in any case, conscious perceptual 
attention to an object makes the difference as to whether a subject has the kind 
of knowledge necessary to think perceptual demonstrative thoughts about that 
object. The sea of faces case is supposed to legitimize this kind of generalization 
because it is carefully designed such that the only thing H is missing, apart 
from knowledge of reference, is conscious perceptual attention to the woman 
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in question. For example: (i) H has a reliable and active perceptual 
information-link with the woman in question; (ii) H has the ability to make 
guesses about and act with respect to the woman on the basis of this 
information-link; (iii) the woman is, in some sense, making a difference to or 
figuring-in H’s visual experience. The case is also supposed to highlight that, if 
we add conscious perceptual attention to the mix, then the kind of knowledge 
necessary for perceptual demonstrative thought immediately seems to follow. 
As we might put things, the case is designed to show conscious perceptual 
attention to an object and knowledge of reference with respect to that object are 
correlated. That is to say, we can interpret the case as designed to support the 
following correlation claim: 
[C1] One has the kind of knowledge necessary to think perceptual 
demonstrative thoughts about an object iff one consciously perceptually 
attends to that object. 
We can interpret Campbell as going on to claim the best or most natural 
explanation of [C1] is: 
[A] Conscious perceptual attention to an object (and only this) provides 
us with the kind of knowledge necessary to think a perceptual 
demonstrative thought about that object. 
So generalizing from the sea of faces case is also supposed to provide support 
for [A]. And [CT] follows easily from [A] (see chapter 1, §4). This is how I 
suggest we should understand Campbell’s sea of faces argument; or rather, this 
is the reconstruction of Campbell’s rather brief argument I want to discuss here. 
What should we make of the argument? There are two broad strategies we 
might pursue in challenging it. The first strategy would be to challenge the 
claim that [C1] is motivated and supported by consideration of and 
generalization from cases like the sea of faces case. The second strategy would 
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be to challenge the claim that [A] is the best and most natural explanation or 
account of why [C1] seems to hold. I want to pursue only the first strategy here. 
I will suggest we should grant only a modified version of [C1] is made 
compelling by generalizing from the sea of faces case (§2). I then want to 
suggest there are alternative accounts of why this modified version of [C1] 
seems to hold that are incompatible with [A] and [CT] (§§3-4). 
2. Campbell’s correlation claim 
There are different ways we might pursue the first strategy. One way would be 
to try and challenge Campbell’s analysis of the sea of faces case itself. We might 
try and say H probably can think perceptual demonstrative thoughts about the 
woman in question as the case is described. So whatever exactly ‘the kind of 
knowledge necessary to think a perceptual demonstrative thought’ consists in, 
we’d say H has this without consciously perceptually attending to the woman in 
question. This would falsify the bi-conditional I labelled [C1] above. However, I 
won’t pursue this line of thought here. I think we should grant to Campbell at 
least that: (a) it’s very natural to think H can’t think perceptual demonstrative 
thoughts about the woman in question, even though she can point to and 
answer questions about her; (b) there is at least some important and interesting 
sense in which H doesn’t know which woman is in question. However, whether 
points (a) and (b) mean H lacks the kind of knowledge necessary to think a 
perceptual demonstrative thought about the woman is another matter: it could 
be that something else is stopping H being able to think perceptual 
demonstrative thoughts. As we’ve seen it’s very difficult to pin down exactly 
what this kind of knowledge consists in (see chapter 1, §4), so I suggest it’s very 
difficult to tell either way.22  
                                                      
22 In fact I suggest it can be difficult to see why H wouldn’t have knowledge of reference in the 
thin and technical sense described in chapter 1, §4, as the case is described. That is, it can be 
difficult to see why we should think there is nothing causing and justifying or grounding and 
controlling the pattern of use H makes with the demonstrative concept ‘that woman’. We 
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Another, perhaps more promising way to pursue the first strategy would be to 
challenge Campbell’s generalization from the sea of faces case. We might try to 
think of cases in which conscious perceptual attention to an object and the kind 
of identificatory knowledge necessary to think a perceptual demonstrative 
thought about that object seem to come apart. To this end we might try to 
construct cases where: (i) one does not consciously perceptually attend to an 
object, but one does seem to have the kind of knowledge necessary to think a 
perceptual demonstrative thought about the object; or, cases where: (ii) one 
does consciously perceptually attend to an object, but nonetheless one does not 
seem to have the kind of knowledge necessary to think a perceptual 
demonstrative thought about that object. 
I suggest constructing type-(ii) cases will be very difficult. One thing 
Campbell’s sea of faces case seems to successfully bring out is that conscious 
perceptual attention to an object does seem to be immediately accompanied by 
knowledge of reference. As soon as a subject consciously perceptually attends 
to an object it’s reasonable to think that, as long as she has a general capacity to 
think perceptual demonstrative thoughts about perceptually salient objects, she 
will thereby be able to think perceptual demonstrative thoughts about that 
object. And if the subject is able to think perceptual demonstrative thoughts 
about the object, then she must already have the knowledge necessary for such 
thought. So at least one half of the bi-conditional in [C1] seems plausible. That 
is to say, it seems plausible from considering and generalizing from Campbell’s 
sea of faces case that: 
[C2] If one consciously perceptually attends to an object, then one has 
the kind of knowledge necessary to think perceptual demonstrative 
                                                                                                                                              
might reasonably think the processes or mechanisms in H’s visual system that have somehow 
latched onto the correct woman, and are feeding and controlling H’s responses and actions, are 
playing exactly this role. This suggests Campbell is probably primarily employing his more 
intuitive and colloquial notion of knowledge of reference in this argument, and that the two 
notions of knowledge of reference really can come apart (see discussion in chapter 1, §4). 
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thoughts about that object. 
Trying to construct type-(i) cases might be more promising. For example, one 
thing to note about the sea of faces case is it involves a crowded room, full of 
many potential objects for demonstrative identification. Perhaps something 
like this feature of the sea of faces case makes Campbell’s generalization to [C1] 
illegitimate. To develop this idea we might try and adapt one of Campbell’s 
other cases that doesn’t have this feature. We can imagine that H and S “are 
standing side by side on an observation platform high in the sky” (2002: 25). 
Imagine H is gripping the railing on the platform tightly, staring intently at and 
perceptually attending to her hands. Let us suppose H has been doing this the 
whole time she and S have been up on the platform. Now suppose S makes 
some remarks about a gold-domed building, which is in front of S and H, is 
figuring-in the periphery of H’s visual experience, and is the only building in 
view. We might wonder: Could H have the kind of identificatory knowledge 
necessary to think a perceptual demonstrative thought about the gold-domed 
building in this situation, when H does not consciously perceptually attend to 
the building (and has not attended to it recently)? If she could, then [C1] is 
false.  
One way we could get a grip on this question would be to ask: Do we think H 
could in fact think perceptual demonstrative thoughts about the gold-domed 
building in this situation? If she can then she must have the relevant knowledge. 
Now there is certainly a sense in which it’s natural to think H can think 
perceptual demonstrative thoughts about the gold-domed building. But this 
may just be because there is also a sense in which, unlike in the original sea of 
faces case, H can easily consciously perceptually attend to the gold-domed 
building: all she has to do is look up. But I suggest it’s unclear we can imagine 
H essaying a perceptual demonstrative thought about the gold-domed building 
without thereby also imagining H has consciously perceptually attended to the 
building. If we insist on stipulating H cannot consciously perceptually attend to 
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the building at any point—e.g. because H is too terrified to shift her attention 
from her hands—then this just seems tantamount to stipulating H cannot 
single out or select the building for thought (on the basis of her perceptual 
encounter with it), in which case it doesn’t seem as if H can think perceptual 
demonstrative thoughts about the gold-domed building. If this line of thought 
is correct, should we grant Campbell the other half of the bi-conditional in 
[C1]? (That is, grant to Campbell the half that says ‘knowledge of reference 
entails conscious perceptual attention’; recall I’ve already suggested it’s 
plausible to think ‘conscious perceptual attention entails knowledge of 
reference). 
I suggest not. Note we’ve tried to test Campbell’s claim that ‘having the kind of 
knowledge necessary to think a perceptual demonstrative thought about an 
object entails conscious perceptual attention to that object’ by trying to see if 
we can imagine cases in which a subject actually thinks a perceptual 
demonstrative thought about an object without consciously perceptually 
attending to that object. We found it is difficult to imagine any such cases. This 
provides some support for the following claim: 
[C3] If one thinks a perceptual demonstrative thought about an object, 
then one consciously perceptually attends to that object. 23 
But notice [C3] doesn’t entail or suggest there are not cases in which a subject 
has the kind of knowledge necessary to think a perceptual demonstrative 
thought about an object but does not consciously perceptually attend to that 
object. This is because it seems possible a subject might have this kind of 
knowledge but nonetheless may not actually think a perceptual demonstrative 
                                                      
23 It’s essential to notice the correlation claims I’m discussing here (i.e. the ‘[C_]’ claims) are 
now about the relation between three different things: (a) conscious perceptual attention; (b) 
the kind of knowledge necessary to think a perceptual demonstrative thought (i.e. knowledge of 
reference); (c) perceptual demonstrative thought itself. [C1] and [C2] are about the relation 
between (a) and (b); [C3] is about the relation between (a) and (c). 
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thought about the object. Whatever exactly the kind of knowledge necessary to 
think a perceptual demonstrative thought consists in, it doesn’t seem plausible 
one’s having this knowledge always entails one actually thinks a perceptual 
demonstrative thought about an object (or, at least, we haven’t been given any 
reason at all to think this is so). If that’s right then [C3] does not entail: 
[C4] If one has the kind of knowledge necessary to think a perceptual 
demonstrative thought about an object, then one consciously 
perceptually attends to that object. 
[C2] and [C4] would entail [C1], which is the claim Campbell is after, but [C2] 
and [C3] do not.  
Can we support or refute specifically [C4], rather than just [C3], on the basis of 
constructing the kind of imaginary cases we’ve been considering in this 
chapter? It’s unclear to me we can. To properly assess [C4] we’d have to try and 
construct some cases in which a subject: (a) doesn’t actually think a perceptual 
demonstrative thought about an object; (b) has the kind of knowledge 
necessary to think a perceptual demonstrative thought about the object; (c) 
does not consciously perceptually attend to that object. If such cases seem 
possible, this would suggest [C4] is false. If they don’t seem possible, this might 
provide some support for [C4].  
We must concede there is a sense in which it is extremely difficult to imagine 
any such cases. But I suggest this may not be because there is any incoherence 
in imagining a subject has the kind of knowledge mentioned in (b) without 
consciously perceptually attending. That is to say, it may not be because if we 
imagine a subject has knowledge of reference we must also thereby imagine the 
subject consciously perceptually attends to the object in question. Rather, the 
difficulty imagining cases with features (a)-(c) may have much more to do with 
the fact that, as I’ve repeatedly stressed, it is unclear exactly what the kind of 
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identificatory knowledge—i.e. ‘knowledge of reference’—mentioned in (b) 
really consists in. Campbell hasn’t provided us with any detailed or unified 
account and seems unwilling to do so. It’s therefore very difficult to tell 
whether the relevant knowledge is present or absent in any imaginary cases we 
construct. One promising way to tell is to test if we can imagine a subject 
actually thinking a perceptual demonstrative thought. If we can, she must have 
this kind of knowledge. But, I’ve suggested, we can’t use just this method to 
properly assess [C4]. To properly assess specifically [C4], as opposed to just 
[C3], we must also imagine some cases in which the subject does not actually 
think a perceptual demonstrative thought about the object in question. 
If this line of argument is correct then Campbell’s sea of faces argument—or 
rather, my reconstructed version of it—underdetermines whether we should 
accept or reject [C4]. And if that’s right, we should grant Campbell only a 
modified version of [C1]. Recall [C1] claims: 
[C1] One has the kind of knowledge necessary to think perceptual 
demonstrative thoughts about an object iff one consciously perceptually 
attends to that object. 
But our discussion suggests we should grant to Campbell only: 
[C2] If one consciously perceptually attends to an object, then one has 
the kind of knowledge necessary to think perceptual demonstrative 
thoughts about that object. 
And also: 
[C3] If one thinks a perceptual demonstrative thought about an object, 
then one consciously perceptually attends to that object. 
But, crucially, not the claim that would entail [C1] when combined with [C2]: 
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[C4] If one has the kind of knowledge necessary to think a perceptual 
demonstrative thought about an object, then one consciously 
perceptually attends to that object. 
Bear in mind the point here is not we’ve shown [C4] is false (or even 
implausible). Rather I hope to have suggested that once we make a distinction 
between: (i) actually thinking a perceptual demonstrative thought; (ii) having 
the kind of identificatory knowledge necessary to think a perceptual 
demonstrative thought, it is difficult to see how we might establish or motivate 
[C4], as opposed to just [C3], by considering these kinds of imaginary cases. 
What we’d need is some separate argument for specifically [C4] involving some 
detailed and unified account of what it is to have the kind of knowledge 
necessary to think a perceptual demonstrative thought. But, I suggest, we are 
not going to get any such account or argument from Campbell. The question 
we now face is: How does the rest of Campbell’s argument fare, given I’ve 
argued we should accept only a modified version of [C1]?  
Recall Campbell wants to claim the best explanation or account of his 
correlation claim [C1] is: 
[A] Conscious perceptual attention to an object (and only this) is what 
provides us with the kind of knowledge necessary to think a perceptual 
demonstrative thought about that object, 
from which [CT] follows quite easily. But it’s much less clear [A] is the best 
explanation or account of [C2] and [C3]. The key prediction of [A], the one 
that is supposed to make it the most natural explanation or account of what 
seems to be going on in cases like the sea of faces case, is precisely [C4]. If 
conscious perceptual attention to an object (and only this) is what provides us 
with the kind of knowledge necessary to think a perceptual demonstrative 
thought about the object, then [C4] should hold. However I’ve just suggested 
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generalizing from cases like the sea of faces case really underdetermines 
whether [C4] holds, and only supports [C2] and [C3]. In the remainder of this 
chapter I will argue the fact only [C2] and [C3] are supported by the sea of 
faces argument opens the door to at least one alternative explanation of what’s 
going on in cases like the sea of faces case, which involves an account of the 
relation between conscious perceptual attention and perceptual demonstrative 
thought that is incompatible with [A] and [CT]. 
3. The identity view 
One alternative explanation of what’s going on in cases like the sea of faces case 
could explain correlation claims [C2] and [C3] simply by saying conscious 
perceptual attention and perceptual demonstrative thought are, in a sense, 
identical. To motivate this view, we could think back to chapter 1, §2. There I 
claimed there is a perfectly good sense in which we can consciously attend to an 
object just by consciously thinking about it. As M.G.F. Martin put it in the 
passage I quoted there: 
In general, whatever we are prepared to call an object of thought—be it the 
things thought about, what one thinks about them, or the proposition one 
thinks in thinking these things—we can also take to be an object of attention. 
Conscious, active thought is simply a mode of attending to the subject matter 
of such thoughts (1997: 77). 
Of course, in general, to consciously attend to an object in thought is not to 
think a perceptual demonstrative thought about that object. And, in general, to 
consciously attend to an object in thought is not to consciously perceptually 
attend to it. But we might think we can apply this model in the perceptual case 
and say: to consciously perceptually attend to an object is just to think some 
perceptually-based thought about the object (i.e. a perceptual demonstrative 
thought). On this view conscious perceptual attention is just a special mode of 
the kind of conscious attention we pay to objects simply by thinking about 
them: it’s the mode of conscious attention we pay to objects when we think 
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specifically perceptual demonstrative thoughts about them. This view holds 
conscious attention and conscious thought are more or less the same thing, and 
that this is so for perceptual as well as non-perceptual forms of conscious 
attention. Filling this out in a bit more detail we might say, in the perceptual 
case, we consciously select or highlight objects in our experience by selecting 
those objects in perceptual demonstrative thought, and that, as a result of this, 
we come to have a distinctive attentive experience of those objects. Let us label 
this rival account or explanation of [C2] and [C3] the ‘identity view’.24 
The identity view could provide an explanation or account of why our 
correlation claims [C2] and [C3] seem to hold. If the identity view were correct, 
the kind of identificatory knowledge necessary for perceptual demonstrative 
thought about an object would equally be necessary for conscious perceptual 
attention to an object, so we get an explanation of why [C2] seems to hold. Also, 
the identity view clearly predicts that and explains how actually thinking a 
perceptual demonstrative thought entails the presence of conscious perceptual 
attention. It claims they’re just the same thing. So it also predicts and explains 
[C3]. Now the identity view might well have trouble accounting for [C4], but in 
§2 I argued we haven’t yet been given reason to think [C4] is true. Also notice 
that since the identity view claims conscious perceptual attention and 
perceptual demonstrative thought are identical it is, on the face of things at 
least, a genuine rival to and incompatible with [CT]. If conscious perceptual 
attention and perceptual demonstrative thought are identical then, on the face 
of things, they cannot be explanatorily related in the way [CT] claims. 25  
                                                      
24 This kind of view is not completely without precedent in the philosophical literature on 
attention. Roughly similar views of conscious perceptual attention have recently been endorsed 
by, for example, James Stazicker (2011b) and Wayne Wu (2011a) (but not in the context of 
assessing Campbell’s sea of faces argument; these authors are more interested in accounting for 
the phenomenological effects of conscious perceptual attention on experience). 
25 Note there is certainly logical space for further rival accounts of what’s going on in cases like 
the sea of faces case. For example one might claim conscious perceptual attention and 
perceptual demonstrative thought are correlated (i.e. [C2] and [C3] hold) because they are just 
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How generally plausible is this identity view? Well the identity view faces two 
immediate objections. One objection claims there is something implausible 
about the identity view’s account of perceptual demonstrative thought. The 
other objection claims there is something implausible about the identity view’s 
account of conscious perceptual attention. These two objections reveal the 
precise form any identity view must take, if it is to be at all plausible, so they are 
worth considering in some detail. 
4. Two objections 
Objection 1 One way to frame the first objection is in terms of the identity 
view’s picture of the temporal relation between perceptual demonstrative 
thought and conscious perceptual attention. Recall both the identity view and 
Campbell are committed to and are able to explain correlation claim [C3]: 
[C3] If one thinks a perceptual demonstrative thought about an object, 
then one consciously perceptually attends to that object. 
As formulated here [C3] essentially says: if you think a perceptual 
demonstrative thought about an object then conscious perceptual attention 
must be present at some point. But [C3] leaves open whether conscious 
perceptual attention must be present prior to the thought episode, 
simultaneous with the thought episode, or after the thought episode. With this 
in mind we can note the identity view and Campbell are each committed to 
different more specific versions of [C3]. The identity view is committed to: 
                                                                                                                                              
two effects of a common cause, which are not otherwise causally or explanatorily related. This 
view is likely to claim some of the mechanisms that cause and underpin episodes of conscious 
perceptual attention and perceptual demonstrative thought are shared, such that episodes of 
perceptual demonstrative thought also give rise to episodes of conscious perceptual attention. 
The main problem with this ‘common-cause view’ is that it appears to give a unsatisfactory 
account of what conscious perceptual attention is. It appears to treat conscious perceptual 
attention as just a strange side-effect of perceptual demonstrative thought. It’s reasonable to 
suggest this kind of view is puzzling, unsatisfactory and unmotivated: we don’t generally think 
explanations that posit strange, epiphenomenal psychological phenomena are good 
explanations. For this reason I’ll set aside the common-cause view in what follows and 
concentrate on [CT] and the identity view. 
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[C3-I] If one actually thinks a perceptual demonstrative thought about 
an object, then one consciously perceptually attends to that object at the 
same time as one actually thinks the thought. 
Whereas Campbell is committed to the weaker claim: 
[C3-C] If one actually thinks a perceptual demonstrative thought about 
an object, then one consciously perceptually attends to that object either 
prior to the thought or at the same time as one actually thinks the 
thought.26 
So one way to object to the identity view would be to claim we should prefer 
[C3-I] to [C3-C].  
One consideration that may lead us to prefer [C3-C] to [C3-I] is the fact it is 
often said one can think a perceptual demonstrative thought about an object 
after it has disappeared from view and when it is not possible to consciously 
perceptually attend to the object (see, e.g., Russell 1918: 201, 203; 1984: 65-
73ff.). If that is right, then [C3-I] cannot be true. For example, consider a case 
where from time t1-t2 one sees a car zoom past, such that at t2 the car disappears 
from view, and such that one begins to essay a perceptual demonstrative 
thought about the car at t3 (some time shortly after t2). Perhaps one thinks to 
oneself ‘That was fast’. Clearly one cannot consciously perceptually attend to 
the car in essaying this thought at t3. Insofar as conscious perceptual attention 
is involved in our essaying this thought ([C3] suggests it must be somehow), it 
seems such attention must be involved prior to one essaying the thought (i.e. 
some time between t1-t2). This might lead us to think it is [C3-C] we should 
accept, and not [C3-I]. 
                                                      
26 If we think Campbell really intends the explanatory relation between conscious perceptual 
attention and knowledge of reference to be causal (see chapter 1, §3), and if we want to rule-out 
simultaneous causation, then Campbell may be committed to [C3-C] with only the first 
disjunct. This doesn’t affect the argument below. 
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The obvious way to reply to this objection would be to claim the thought one 
would essay at t3 is not really a perceptual demonstrative thought. We might try 
and claim the thought one would essay at t3 is some kind of ‘backwards-looking’ 
demonstrative thought, distinct in kind from the ordinary perceptual 
demonstrative thought one could essay while the object of thought is perceived, 
such that we cannot assume, without some argument, that conscious 
perceptual attention bears the same relation to episodes of backwards-looking 
demonstrative thought and episodes of ordinary perceptual demonstrative 
thought. However to make this reply work the identity view would need to 
justify the claim that the ways in which we think of objects in the backwards-
looking cases are relevantly different from the ways in which we think of 
objects when we think ordinary perceptual demonstrative thoughts on the basis 
of current perception. The identity view would need to justify the claim we 
have two different kinds of demonstrative thought here. How could we decide 
whether or not these claims are acceptable? 
This raises some tricky questions about how we should carve up kinds of 
thought or ways of thinking. But one consideration that might help us here is 
the issue of when it is legitimate to ‘trade on the identity’ of an object in 
thought.27 We trade on the identity of an object in thought when we make 
inferences from distinct episodes of thought about the object, without making 
any identity judgement. For example, consider the following inference: 
(1) Hesperus is F 
(2) Phosphorus is G 
–––––––––––––––––––––––– 
(3) Something is both F and G 
                                                      
27 This phrase is actually Campbell’s (1987; 1994: 73-88). Note that Campbell himself doesn’t 
consider the identity view or this objection to it, and doesn’t discuss trading on identity in the 
context of defending what I’ve called [CT].  
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As it stands, it doesn’t seem this inference is valid. To reach (3) from (1)-(2) it 
appears we need the extra identity judgement: ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’. As we 
might put it, it does not seem legitimate to trade on the identity of the object 
referred to by the token of ‘Hesperus’ in (1) and the object referred to by the 
token of ‘Phosphorus’ in (2) to reach (3). We can compare this inference with:  
(4) Hesperus is F 
(5) Hesperus is G 
–––––––––––––––––––––––– 
(6) Something is both F and G  
This second inference does seem to be valid. It seems legitimate to trade on the 
identity of the object referred to by the tokens of ‘Hesperus’ in (4) and (5). That 
is, it seems legitimate to move from (4)-(5) to (6) in thought without making 
any identity judgement. 
It could be objected these appearances are misleading and that, in fact, 
inference (4)-(6) may not be all that different from inference (1)-(3). For 
example we might claim that, strictly speaking, for argument (4)-(6) to be valid 
we really do need an identity premise, which may be implicit or suppressed 
because it is so trivial. So we’d need something like: 
(4) Hesperus is F 
(5) Hesperus is G 
(ID) Hesperus = Hesperus 
–––––––––––––––––––––––– 
(6) Something is both F and G 
But for this new inference to be valid we’d need to trade on the identity of the 
object referred to by one of the tokens of ‘Hesperus’ in (ID) and the object 
referred to by the token of ‘Hesperus’ in (4), and we’d need to trade on the 
identity of the object referred to by the other token of ‘Hesperus’ in (ID) and 
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the object referred to by the token of ‘Hesperus’ in (5). If we don’t allow this 
trading on identity, then we’d need another pair of identity premises to make 
the inference valid. So it should be clear that if we don’t allow ourselves to trade 
on identity in at least some cases then we’ll soon face a regress. As such, it must 
sometimes be legitimate to trade on the identity of an object across distinct 
thought episodes.28 
This raises the question: When exactly is it legitimate to trade on the identity of 
an object in thought, given that it must sometimes be legitimate? A popular 
answer is it is legitimate to trade on the identity of an object in thought iff the 
object is thought of in the same way, under the same mode of presentation 
(Campbell 1987). This seems to be the natural way to explain the difference 
between inferences such as (1)-(3) and (4)-(6). Let us assume this is correct. 
These ideas might help us decide whether ordinary perceptual demonstrative 
thought and backwards-looking demonstrative thought should count as 
relevantly different kinds of demonstrative thought. If it is legitimate to trade 
on the identity of an object across episodes of ordinary perceptual 
demonstrative thought and episodes of backwards-looking demonstrative 
thought then we might think it must be the object is being thought of in the 
same way, such that the subject is essaying the same kind of demonstrative 
thought with the same demonstrative content and concepts. If this were true 
the identity view may be in trouble. If ordinary perceptual demonstrative 
thought and backwards-looking demonstrative thought are really the same 
kind of demonstrative thought then we might think it would probably be 
implausible to claim they bear different relations to conscious perceptual 
attention. Since it’s clearly not true conscious perceptual attention could be 
present at the same time as and could be identical to backwards-looking 
demonstrative thought, the argument goes, it will probably be implausible to 
                                                      
28 This kind of argument can be found in Campbell 1987: 275-276; cf. Fine 2007. 
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think conscious perceptual attention is always present at the same time as and 
is identical to ordinary perceptual demonstrative thought. Thus, the argument 
claims, we should reject [C3-I] and the identity view. 
If all this were right the identity view would be committed to claiming it’s not 
legitimate to trade on the identity of an object across episodes of ordinary 
perceptual demonstrative thought and episodes of backwards-looking 
demonstrative thought. But this seems implausible. Surely, in the case 
described above, one could trade on the identity of the car as it figures in an 
ordinary perceptual demonstrative thought episode (e.g. the judgement ‘That’s 
a Porsche’, made while the car is still in view) and a backwards-looking 
demonstrative thought episode (e.g. the judgement ‘That was going fast’, made 
after the car has disappeared from view), to infer something like: ‘That Porsche 
was going fast’. It’s natural to think one could do this without having to judge 
the objects of thought are identical. This seems to be simply manifest or given 
to the subject. 
However I want to argue the identity theorist can respond to objection 1 
without legislating against this kind of trading on identity. To see this let us 
distinguish more carefully between: (i) episodes of thinking, (ii) the thought 
contents or propositional objects entertained during such episodes; (iii) the 
psychological capacities exercised in actualising such thought episodes. The 
trading on identity argument seems to show episodes of ordinary perceptual 
demonstrative thought and episodes of backwards-looking demonstrative 
thought can involve a subject entertaining the very same demonstrative 
thought contents (and deploying the same demonstrative concepts). Let us 
accept this is so. The objection against the identity view claims this means 
episodes of backwards-looking demonstrative thought and episodes of ordinary 
perceptual demonstrative thought are thought episodes of the same kind and 
involve the same way of thinking about an object. The objection then claims 
this means episodes of backwards-looking demonstrative thought and episodes 
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of ordinary perceptual demonstrative thought must be actualised by the same 
or similar psychological capacities, i.e. must bear the same relation to conscious 
perceptual attention. 
We can see the argument relies on the following general principles:  
[P1] If thought episodes e1 and e2 share the same thought contents, then 
e1 and e2  are thought episodes of the same kind. 
[P2] If thought episodes e1 and e2 are thought episodes of the same kind, 
then e1 and e2 are actualised by the same psychological capacities.  
Both [P1] and [P2] have some plausibility. However I want to suggest it’s 
doubtful [P1] and [P2] are both true on a single understanding of ‘thought 
episode of the same kind’. I suggest [P1] is true only when we individuate kinds 
of thought episode by the contents entertained or concepts deployed during 
such thought episodes, and that [P2] is true only when we individuate kinds of 
thought episode by the psychological capacities exercised in actualising the 
thought episode. One way to bring this out is to note that if [P1] and [P2] were 
both true on a single understanding of ‘thought episode of the same kind’, then 
the following would be true: 
[P3] If thought episodes e1 and e2 are actualised by different 
psychological capacities, then e1 and e2 have different thought contents. 
But there’s reason to think [P3] is implausible. If the line of thought behind this 
objection against the identity view leads to [P3] then it threatens to prove too 
much. This is because it’s often argued that if we are to account for our general 
inferential capabilities—for example, how we trade on the identity of objects of 
thought across time and across different perceptual modalities, and how we 
manage to think and keep track of indexical thoughts in different contexts—
then we must allow we can sometimes entertain the same thought contents at 
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different times or in different contexts, and do so by exercising what seem to be 
very different sets of psychological capacities (see, e.g., Campbell 1987, 1996; 
Evans 1985: 306-311; Frege 1956: 296ff.; Prosser 2005; Recanati 2012: 81-88ff.).  
If these ideas are correct then we should reject [P3]: we should allow that 
different thought episodes that involve a subject entertaining identical thought 
contents can be actualised by different sets of psychological capacities.29 That 
means there’s reason to doubt [P1] and [P2] are true under a single 
understanding of ‘thought episode of the same kind’. And if that’s right 
objection 1 fails: it would be open to the identity view to claim episodes of 
ordinary perceptual demonstrative thought and episodes of backwards-looking 
demonstrative thought can be actualised by different sets of psychological 
capacities, i.e. can bear different relations to conscious perceptual attention, 
even when these thought episodes share the very same demonstrative content 
and involve a subject deploying the very same demonstrative concepts. 
That said, objection 1 does reveal some commitments of the identity view. If 
any form of the identity view is to be plausible, it must claim episodes of 
perceptual demonstrative thought differ from episodes of other kinds of 
demonstrative thought (e.g. backwards-looking demonstrative thought), not in 
virtue of the contents entertained or concepts deployed during such thought 
episodes, but rather in virtue of the different psychological capacities that 
                                                      
29 Of course, all this does rather depend on how one chooses to individuate psychological 
capacities. In response to these points, an objector might try and insist that we should always 
individuate the psychological capacities exercised during episodes of thinking by the contents 
entertained during such episodes. But then: (a) In light of the brief points above about cross-
temporal and cross-modal thought, it’s unclear to me this would leave us with a particularly 
natural picture of what a psychological capacity is and how such capacities are individuated 
(for example, we’d probably have to say that thought episodes occurring on different days—e.g. 
some involving memory and some not involving memory—were actualised by the same 
psychological capacities); (b) it’s unclear the objector could then insist that episodes of 
backwards looking demonstrative thought and episodes of ordinary perceptual demonstrative 
thought involve a subject exercising different psychological capacities, despite their bearing 
different relations to conscious perceptual attention. But I won’t pursue these difficult issues 
any further here.  
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actualise such thought episodes. So the identity view should be understood as 
claiming episodes of perceptual demonstrative thought are in part actualised by 
conscious perceptual attention, but also that one could think another kind of 
demonstrative thought with the very same content when one is not currently 
consciously perceptually attending to the object. 30 However it’s unclear, for all 
that’s been said so far, that these commitments of the identity view are 
particularly problematic. For all that’s been said so far, this seems to be a viable 
view of what’s distinctive about perceptual demonstrative thought.31 
Objection 2 One way to frame the second objection against the identity view is 
to note the identity view is, on the face of things, committed to an extra 
correlation claim which does not seem to be supported by the sea of faces 
argument and to which [CT] is not committed. This extra correlation claim is 
the converse of correlation claim [C3]. It says: 
[C5] If one consciously perceptually attends to an object, then one 
thinks a perceptual demonstrative thought about that object. 
We might ask: Is it not obviously possible to consciously perceptually attend to 
an object, in certain contexts, without thinking any kind of thought about that 
object? If it is possible then, insofar as the identity view really is committed to 
[C5], the identity view should be rejected. 
One way to reply to this objection would be to try to deny commitment to [C5] 
is really problematic. One might just insist that, perhaps despite appearances to 
the contrary, it is not possible to consciously perceptually attend to an object 
without thereby thinking at least some kind of, perhaps relatively ‘low-level’, 
perceptual demonstrative thought about that object. For example, the identity 
                                                      
30 If we think back to chapter 1, §3 this means one will have to deny principle [Q] (but not 
necessarily principle [P]). 
31 Note that it’s perfectly consistent with the characterisation of perceptual demonstrative 
thought I gave in chapter 1, §3.  
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view might appeal to perceptual demonstrative thoughts or judgements that, in 
some sense, merely categorize an object or register an object’s presence in one’s 
environment, and perhaps lack complex propositional structure. 
But we can push this objection harder against the identity view. We can point 
to some concrete cases in which it seems a subject is clearly consciously 
perceptually attending to an object (or some objects), but in which it seems 
implausible, or rather desperate, to insist a subject is thinking any thought 
about the object (or objects). For example, we might consider a case in which a 
subject is instructed to divide her attention across several items in a display, 
hold her attention on those items over a period of time and report any changes 
in those particular items as quickly as possible, while ignoring any distractor 
items in the display.32 It appears this is a genuine case of conscious perceptual 
attention: the subject is instructed to perceptually attend, she would describe 
herself as perceptually attending, and she consciously experiences the items she 
is attending to. But it doesn’t seem plausible to claim the subject is attending by 
thinking perceptual demonstrative thoughts about the items in the display. For 
example, it doesn’t seem the subject must be thinking some constant stream or 
babble of perceptual demonstrative thoughts about all the items she attends to 
while she monitors them. Also, it seems open that the subject might choose to 
make a perceptual demonstrative judgement about one particular item in the 
display (e.g. in response to a change in that item). So it doesn’t seem she must 
be already engaged in perceptual demonstrative thought about all the items she 
is attending to. It just doesn’t seem plausible conscious perceptual attention 
entails perceptual demonstrative thought in these kinds of cases. If that’s right 
then commitment to [C5] really is problematic. 
                                                      
32 In the empirical literature it is now generally thought it is possible—albeit difficult—for 
subjects to deliberately divide their visual attention across noncontiguous regions of the visual 
field and even across different visual objects (see the experiments described in, e.g., Duncan 
1984; Huang and Pashler 2007; Pashler 1998: 101-167; Scholl 2001). 
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This objection is a potentially serious one. But I want to suggest there may be 
room for the identity view to reply by denying it is really committed to [C5]. I 
suggest objection 2 reveals that, if the identity view is to be at all plausible, it 
must take its identity claim to apply to only one particular kind of conscious 
perceptual attention. This is because we’ve seen there are at least some things it 
is very natural to call ‘conscious perceptual attention’ that cannot be identical 
to perceptual demonstrative thought. So to survive this objection the identity 
view must claim there are different kinds of conscious perceptual attention and 
give up on the idea that conscious perceptual attention in thought—i.e. the kind 
it would say is identical to perceptual demonstrative thought—is the only kind 
of conscious perceptual attention there is. But if there are different kinds of 
conscious perceptual attention then objection 2 needn’t be especially worrying 
for the identity view: it can simply deny it is committed to [C5] (at least, when 
[C5] is taken to apply to conscious perceptual attention in general).  
Now if we admit there may be different kinds of conscious perceptual attention, 
then discussion of these issues is going to become somewhat more complex and 
delicate, and there are going to be different versions of the identity view. But 
notice one version of the identity view could admit [C5] is false, in this way, 
while remaining a genuine rival to [CT] and while still giving an alternative 
account of what is going on in cases like the sea of faces case. To see this note 
that, given objection 2, any plausible version of the identity view is minimally 
committed to the following three claims: 
(a) There are different kinds of conscious perceptual attention. 
(b) At least one kind of conscious perceptual attention is identical to 
perceptual demonstrative thought. 
(c) Some kinds of conscious perceptual attention are not identical to 
perceptual demonstrative thought. 
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And any identity view will also clearly hold that: 
(d) Any kinds of conscious perceptual attention that are identical to 
perceptual demonstrative thought don’t bear an explanatory relation to 
perceptual demonstrative thought. 
But all this leaves open whether any of the kinds of conscious perceptual 
attention mentioned in (c) bear an explanatory relation to perceptual 
demonstrative thought. This means we have at least two different versions of 
the identity view. The first version of the identity view holds, in addition to (a)-
(d), that: 
(e) The kinds of conscious perceptual attention that are not identical to 
perceptual demonstrative thought do not bear an explanatory relation to 
perceptual demonstrative thought. 
This version of the identity view is completely incompatible with [CT]. 
According to it, no kind of conscious perceptual attention is explanatorily 
related to perceptual demonstrative thought. This version of the identity view 
will claim we can fully explain the data from Campbell’s sea of faces case—that 
is, why [C2] and [C3] seem to hold—just by appealing to the kind of conscious 
perceptual attention that is identical to perceptual demonstrative thought (see 
the account in §3 above). So it will claim we haven’t been given reason to think 
any of the other kinds of conscious perceptual attention, not identical to 
perceptual demonstrative thought, are explanatorily related to, or even 
correlated with, perceptual demonstrative thought. In contrast the second 
version of the identity view holds, in addition to (a)-(d), that: 
(e*) At least one of the kinds of conscious perceptual attention that are 
not identical to perceptual demonstrative thought does bear an 
explanatory relation to perceptual demonstrative thought. 
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This version of the identity view is, we might think, compatible with the spirit 
of [CT]. Campbell’s Thesis will be vindicated to some extent: some form of 
conscious perceptual attention will explain our capacities for perceptual 
demonstrative thought.33  
The key point here is that, for all that’s been said so far, the sea of faces 
argument completely underdetermines which version of the identity view is 
correct (if either is). If that’s right then we might think there is a version of the 
identity view, the first version, that: (i) could reply to objection 2 (by claiming 
there are different kinds of conscious perceptual attention and thereby deny 
commitment to [C5]); (ii) could account for [C2] and [C3]; (iii) is 
incompatible with even the spirit of Campbell’s Thesis. 
However for this kind of response to objection 2 to be at all satisfying, we’d 
have to provide some motivation for and defense of the view there really are 
different kinds of conscious perceptual attention, or that there are different 
things that we do when we consciously perceptually attend. In fact, we’d 
probably have to motivate the view there are some quite radically different 
kinds of conscious perceptual attention (or radically different things that we do 
when we consciously perceptually attend). I say this because there doesn’t seem 
to be much in common between: (a) what we do when we divide our attention 
across several items so as to visually monitor them (as in the example above); 
(b) what we do when we consciously perceptually attend to objects by thinking 
perceptual demonstrative thoughts about them. So for this reply to objection 2 
to work, we’d probably have to motivate and defend a quite fragmentary view 
of conscious perceptual attention, according to which there are an assortment 
of different conscious perceptual capacities, processes or activities we are 
inclined to call ‘attention’ or ‘attentive’, with different functions and 
explanatory roles, and which involve a subject exercising rather different 
                                                      
33 I discus how much this preserves the spirit of [CT] in §5 below. 
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psychological capacities (e.g., perhaps, conceptual vs. non-conceptual 
capacities). What might motivate such a ‘disunity view’ of conscious perceptual 
attention? I think there are two sets of considerations we could appeal to here. 
First, such a disunity view might be motivated by some apparent disunity of 
perceptual attention at the level of information-processing mechanisms. In the 
empirical literature on perceptual attention it is not uncommon to find some 
uncertainty and cautiousness, and even a degree of scepticism, with respect to 
what is really picked out by ‘attention’ or ‘attentive’ (e.g. a particular selective 
mechanism or system of control, a particular type of or stage in perceptual 
processing, a particular limited resource drawn on in perceptual processing, 
etc.). For example, consider the following passage from Alan Allport: 
Even a brief survey of the heterogeneity and functional separability of 
different components of spatial and nonspatial attentional control prompts 
the conclusion that, qua causal mechanism, there can be no such thing as 
attention. There is no one uniform computational function, or mental 
operation (in general no one causal mechanism) to which all so-called 
attentional phenomena can be attributed. On the contrary, there is a rich 
diversity of neuropsychological control mechanisms of many different 
kinds (and no doubt many yet to be discovered) from whose cooperative 
and competitive interactions emerge the behavioral manifestations of 
attention [of which there is a “vast range”] (1993: 203-204). 
We should admit Allport is probably a particularly sceptical voice in the 
empirical literature. But other writers have expressed similar concerns. For 
example, the generally much less sceptical Harold Pashler explains the 
structure of his book on attention with the following highly cautionary 
remarks:  
The dangers of taking substantive words from ordinary language and 
assuming a corresponding entity h;ave been noticed for a long time, of 
course; philosophers at least as far back as Bacon have warned against 
assuming that where there is a word there must be a thing (this is often 
called reification) … To avoid these pitfalls, the word attention is used 
sparingly in this book … In chapters 2 through 4 … the use of ‘attention’ 
will be restricted to describing the field of study or the instructions given to 
the subject … ‘Attention’ will not, however, be used to refer to a putative 
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internal process or mechanism … In the fifth and sixth chapters the role of 
attention as a theoretical construct will be considered explicitly and 
critically, and a framework postulating several different attention 
mechanisms will emerge (1998: 3-5). 
Also, John Duncan begins his review of recent work on the brain mechanisms 
of attention as follows: 
As Wittgenstein argued, there are many concepts that cannot be given a 
formal definition. No single rule, for example, can define what does and 
does not count as ‘a game’. Instead games form a family, with many 
different resemblances between one member and another, but no defining 
characteristic shared by all. If this applies to games, certainly it applies to 
psychological concepts like attention. Both in behaviour and 
neurophysiology, there are many studies of ‘attentional’ phenomena. 
Though doubtless these have family resemblances, it seems unlikely that 
they share any one defining component or ingredient (2006: 2-3). 
Finally, consider the following from Raja Parasuraman:  
The central thesis [of this collection of empirical papers on attention] is 
that attention is not a single entity but a name given to a finite set of brain 
processes that can interact mutually and with other brain processes in the 
performance of different perceptual, cognitive, and motor tasks. At the 
psychological level attention is not any one thing … There cannot be a 
single definition of, and probably not a single overarching theory of 
attention (1998: 4). 
It’s not at all uncommon to find remarks like these in empirical work on 
attention and attentional mechanisms.34 How might this bear on a disunity 
view?  
Well we must make clear the disunity view I’m discussing here is a thesis about 
conscious perceptual attention. As stressed in chapter 1: §2, this is supposed to 
be something that occurs at the personal level; it is supposed to be familiar  to 
introspection and part of our commonsense psychology. And it’s reasonable to 
suggest unity or disunity at the level of information-processing doesn’t 
straightforwardly or directly bear on unity or disunity at the personal level. As 
                                                      
34 For other examples see, e.g., Allport 2011; Chun et al. 2011; Driver 2001: 73ff.; Johnston and 
Dark 1986; Moray 1968; Ruff 2011. 
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such, the alleged disunity of attentional mechanisms certainly wouldn’t entail a 
personal level disunity view: we might think conscious perceptual attention 
could be a unified psychological phenomenon despite considerable disunity at 
the level of sub-personal mechanisms.35 Nonetheless, I suggest this apparent 
disunity at the level of sub-personal mechanisms, and especially the diversity of 
the functions attentional mechanisms and processes are said to carry out, could 
provide at least some cogent motivation for a disunity view; especially when we 
note the uncertainty and cautiousness many scientists seem to display with 
respect to what they are picking out when they study attention, and whether 
they are picking out any single unified thing. Furthermore the quotations above 
suggest we can rest assured that the scepticism expressed by disunity views of 
conscious perceptual attention doesn’t conflict with the way in which many 
scientists seem to think about attention. It doesn’t seem to be a presupposition 
of much of the empirical work on attention that there is a unified psychological 
phenomenon here.36 
                                                      
35 In fact, plenty of philosophers who believe in a unified conscious attention, with a single 
explanatory or functional role, recognise this apparent disunity of attentional mechanisms, and 
suggest we might find some higher-level unity by claiming these attentional mechanisms are all 
somehow explanatorily related to—e.g. they underpin or realize—a single, unified personal 
level phenomenon (see, e.g., Watzl 2011; Smithies 2011a; Stazicker 2011b; Wu 2011b) 
36 In reply to these kinds of points a defender of a unified view of conscious perceptual 
attention could point to some recent and impressive research that may show there is more 
unity at the level of attentional mechanisms than the psychologists I quoted above seem to 
think. Liqiang Huang and his colleagues (2012) have recently tried to measure the 
interrelations between 16 different experimental paradigms used to study and manipulate 
perceptual attention, partly out of a worry that these diverse paradigms may not be studying or 
manipulating the same thing (2012: 414ff.). Huang tried to probe whether this is so by 
comparing the performance of hundreds of individual subjects across the 16 different 
experimental paradigms (that is, by making intra-subject, rather than inter-subject 
comparisons). He found that individual subjects tend to perform at the same level across most 
of the experimental paradigms; e.g. subjects who perform well in one experiment tend to 
perform well on most of the experiments; subjects who perform badly in one experiment tend 
to perform badly in most of the other experiments; etc. (see table 2, 423). Huang’s statistical 
analysis of his results suggests this means it’s likely there is a single factor (e.g. an ‘attention’ 
factor) underlying and explaining the subjects’ performance levels (424-226). And we might 
think this suggests a unified set of attentional mechanisms are involved in most of these diverse 
instances of perceptual attention. If this were not the case we might expect to find more 
variation in the performance of individual subjects across the 16 experimental paradigms. That 
said, as Huang points out, there are some limitations to his study, which is the first of its kind 
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A second motivation for a disunity view could appeal more directly to some 
apparent disunity—as well as unclarity and indeterminacy—in our ordinary 
and philosophical thought about personal level conscious perceptual attention. 
It seems ‘conscious perceptual attention’ can be legitimately used to pick out a 
number of rather different things. For example, philosophers have recently 
described conscious perceptual attention as: 
(1) a capacity to single-out, highlight or lock onto particular objects so as 
to set those particular objects as the targets of one’s thoughts or actions, 
and also keep track of those objects over periods of time (Campbell 2002; 
Roessler 2011: 280-281; Smithies 2011b: 30ff.; Wu 2011b). 
 (2) something that provides some organization or narrative structure to 
conscious experiences, without which consciousness would be “a gray 
chaotic indiscriminateness, impossible for us to even conceive” (James 
1890: 403. Also see C. Evans 1970: 81; O’Shaughnessy 2000: 379ff.; Watzl 
2010). 
(3) a kind of limited resource that is used up by and that we distribute 
between conscious experiences. As Brian O’Shaughnessy puts it, we often 
think of attention as a kind of container, ‘psychic space’ or ‘mental 
lifeblood’, such that conscious experiences, whether perceptual or non-
perceptual, “necessitate a measure of attention if they are to so much as 
exist” (2000: 277 and 275-290). 
(4) something that allows us to notice or register things about our 
environment that we wouldn’t have noticed or registered had we not 
                                                                                                                                              
(426-427). In particular, performance in the attentional tasks was also correlated with 
performance in a general intelligence test. This opens up the possibility that Huang’s data 
might be explained by subjects’ general intelligence (what’s called the ‘g factor’) rather than any 
single attention factor. As such it’s unclear how challenging these experiments are to the point 
I’m trying to make here; although I should certainly make clear the disunified view of 
attentional mechanisms is not a universally held view. 
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attended. For example by: (a) determining which aspects of the contents of 
our perceptual experiences are ‘cognitively accessible’; that is to say, 
available for report, judgement or storage in memory (Mole 2008; Smithies 
2011a; Stazicker 2011a); or by: (b) modulating the contents of visual 
experience themselves; that is to say, by determining which objects and 
properties we visually experience, and at which levels of determinacy 
(Stazicker 2011b; Tye 2010). 
(5) A capacity to actively and agentially look and watch (and also to look 
out for and watch out for), rather than merely passively see 
(O’Shaughnessy 2000: 379-405; Crowther 2009a, 2009b; Roessler 1999). 
These accounts of what conscious perceptual attention is, and what conscious 
perceptual attention does, are often presented as if they are in competition with 
each other. But we might think there could be some truth to each account. 
They all seem to describe capacities or processes that could be legitimately 
labelled ‘conscious perceptual attention’. Also notice that, on the face of things, 
(1)-(5) seem to describe rather different capacities or processes, that have 
rather different functions or explanatory roles. So we can see how a disunity 
view might reasonably be motivated to claim there are different kinds of 
conscious perceptual attention, with different explanatory or functional roles, 
which involve a subject exercising different psychological capacities. That is, we 
can see how we might be motivated to think there is no single thing we do 
when we consciously perceptually attend, and think the label ‘conscious 
perceptual attention’ collects together a range of capacities or processes that are 
only loosely related, insofar as they involve some element of selectivity. That 
said, of course, merely pointing out that (1)-(5) can all legitimately be labeled 
‘conscious perceptual attention’ doesn’t entail a disunity view. It could be that 
(1)-(5) are all diverse symptoms of a single unified psychological phenomenon 
(or a single thing we do).  
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Now it’s certainly true that most philosophers working on attention have 
suggested we should adopt a largely unified view of conscious perceptual 
attention. To make some progress here it will be pertinent to ask: Why have 
most philosophers taken this view despite considerable apparent disunity? I 
think a major reason is these philosophers think we ordinarily think of 
conscious perceptual attention as a theoretically significant and unified faculty 
of mind. They seem to think it is phenomenologically or introspectively 
apparent to us that there is just one thing we do when we consciously 
perceptually attend. For example, a defender of a unified view of conscious 
perceptual attention might claim that when someone asks us to attend to an 
object, we generally know exactly what they’re asking us to do, and that it’s not 
as if we generally need to ask: ‘Attend to the object in which sense?’. Another 
way to put this point is to say we have a single term ‘attention’ (which can be 
qualified with ‘perceptual’) as part of our commonsense psychological 
vocabulary, but we don’t have lots of different terms for what the disunity view 
claims are the different disunified kinds of conscious perceptual attention. But 
in response to these kinds of points we might question whether, and warn 
against exaggerating the extent to which, our ordinary notion of attention is 
precise, clear and determinate enough to take any stand on the issue of whether 
conscious perceptual attention is a unity in the sense at issue here. For example, 
we could say the fact we only have a single term ‘attention’ (or ‘conscious 
perceptual attention’) reflects this unclarity, vagueness and indeterminacy in 
our commonsense psychology of attention, more than it reflects any deep 
commonsense commitment to the unity of conscious perceptual attention. 
I think it’s actually extremely difficult to know how to measure whether 
conscious perceptual attention is a unity in the sense at issue here. We’ve seen 
there seem to be things to be said both for and against a disunity view. The 
modest conclusion I want to draw here is that it’s reasonable to think it’s an 
open question whether conscious perceptual attention is disunified enough for 
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a version of the identity view to reply to objection 2 (by denying commitment 
to [C5]); also that we can see how one might be cogently motivated to think 
conscious perceptual attention is disunified in the sense the identity view 
requires. I’ll discuss the implications of this modest conclusion in the next 
section. 
To wrap up this long section: I’ve argued that a version of the identity view 
could reply to both objections. It could reply to objection 1 by denying that all 
episodes of perceptual demonstrative thought have a distinctive kind of 
thought content. And it could reply to objection 2 by taking a disunified view 
of conscious perceptual attention. If it’s acceptable for a version of the identity 
view to claim these things—I suggested the reply to objection 1 is acceptable, 
but left it open whether the reply to objection 2 is acceptable—then I submit 
there is at least one viable explanation of why [C2] and [C3] seem to hold 
which rejects [CT]. 
5. Conclusions and looking ahead 
In this chapter I’ve argued the sea of faces argument is in one sense successful. 
It succeeds in showing—via correlation claims [C2] and [C3]—that there are 
some very intimate connections between conscious perceptual attention and 
perceptual demonstrative thought. But I’ve also tried to argue the argument 
may underdetermine whether Campbell paints the correct picture of this 
relation. This is because a version of the identity view may be able to account 
for these correlations between conscious perceptual attention and perceptual 
demonstrative thought whilst rejecting [CT]. Further to this, I’ve tried to argue 
that whether or not the sea of faces argument is in fact successful in 
establishing [CT] really turns on how unified conscious perceptual attention is. 
This is because the identity view is plausible only if conscious perceptual 
attention is disunified (in the sense that there are different kinds of conscious 
perceptual attention, with different explanatory or functional roles, which 
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involve a subject exercising different psychological capacities).37 We can sum 
up these results with the following pair of conditionals: 
(1) If conscious perceptual attention is a unity in the relevant sense, then 
the sea of faces argument is likely to be successful in establishing [CT] (at 
least: there are no obvious rival explanations of why correlation claims [C2] 
and [C3] seem to hold).  
(2) If conscious perceptual attention is not a unity in the relevant sense, 
then the sea of faces argument doesn’t do enough to show that [CT] is 
correct. There is at least one viable explanation of why [C2] and [C3] seem 
to hold that rejects [CT] (i.e. a version of the identity view).  
I also argued that it’s possible to motivate and defend the view that conscious 
perceptual attention is not a unity in the relevant sense (although it’s difficult to 
know how to decide the issue for certain). If that’s right then a defender of [CT] 
will either have to: (a) try to establish that conscious perceptual attention is a 
unity in the relevant sense; or (b) find some alternative argument for [CT]. 
Given what was said at the end of §4 about the difficulty in establishing unity or 
disunity here, I suggest strategy (b) is the most promising, and this will be the 
focus of the next chapter. 
But there is a complication here. Notice that if conscious perceptual attention is 
not a unity in the sense outlined above, then [CT] would probably need to be 
reformulated. This is because Campbell’s view, as I formulated it in chapter 1, 
appears to hold there is a general explanatory relation between two unified 
phenomena: conscious perceptual attention on the one hand, and perceptual 
                                                      
37 In fact, more generally, if conscious attention is disunified then the sea of faces argument is 
likely to be problematic anyway. If there are lots of different kinds of conscious perceptual 
attention then, when considering cases like the sea of faces case, it may be unclear exactly which 
kinds of attention we are tracking and whether we are tracking the same kinds across different 
instances. This would probably make generalising from the sea of faces case more problematic 
than the argument from §§1-2 of this chapter supposes. 
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demonstrative thought on the other. It seems to be an unstated presupposition 
of Campbell’s view that conscious perceptual attention is a unity (in something 
like the sense outlined above). But, I suggest, if it turned out conscious 
perceptual attention wasn’t a unity in the sense outlined above, then [CT] could 
be reformulated in a way that preserves the spirit of the view. It can be 
reformulated so it claims:  
[CT]* At least one kind of conscious perceptual attention to an object 
explains how we are able to think perceptual demonstrative thoughts 
about that object, and at least one kind of conscious perceptual 
attention to an object is an essential part of this explanatory story, such 
that it is necessary for perceptual demonstrative thought about that 
object. 
This, I suggest, is only a very minor revision to [CT] (except that admitting 
conscious perceptual attention may be disunified somewhat undermines 
Campbell’s sea of faces argument). This is because, as mentioned in chapter 1 
(§5), there is something somewhat schematic or programmatic at the core of 
Campbell’s view of these issues. Campbell’s wider project and point is to say 
that some conscious, perceptual, non-conceptual faculty explains our most 
basic capacities to engage in conceptual thought by providing us with 
knowledge of reference. I mentioned that, on one way of reading Campbell, it 
doesn’t actually matter a huge amount what plays this role, e.g. whether it be 
conscious perceptual attention as a unified psychological kind, or some 
particular type of conscious perceptual attention. In fact, as we saw in chapter 1, 
it can sometimes seem as if Campbell doesn’t have a huge amount to say about 
why it should be conscious perceptual attention, in particular, that plays this 
role, except that it is a promising candidate (and some alternatives have been 
ruled out). 
If all this is right, then the key question for consideration in the next chapter is: 
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Is there some other argument that can convince us we should accept [CT]*, 




THE EXPLANATORY DEMAND 
1. The explanatory demand argument 
We’ve just seen that if we accept the possibility that conscious perceptual 
attention may be disunified in the sense discussed in chapter 2, then the sea of 
faces argument is unsuccessful, and we’ll need a new argument for [CT]*. I 
think we can extract another argument from Reference and Consciousness and 
some of Campbell’s other work that doesn’t rely so much on the unity of 
conscious perceptual attention. The argument is not explicitly stated, but I 
think it’s in the background of some of what Campbell says about the relation 
between conscious perceptual attention and perceptual demonstrative thought. 
The basic idea is that there is an explanatory demand, relating to our abilities to 
think perceptual demonstrative thoughts about objects, which cannot be met 
by any position that rejects [CT]*. The idea is that if we reject the claim that 
some form of conscious perceptual attention explains our abilities to think 
perceptual demonstrative thoughts, then it will be incumbent on us to say what 
does explain them. The argument then claims that any position that rejects 
[CT]* cannot give a satisfactory answer to this explanatory demand. I’ll frame 
the rest of my discussion in the thesis around this explanatory demand 
argument (as I’ll call it) and spend most of the rest of this thesis discussing how 
we might develop the argument. First I’ll set out the core argument in a bit 
more detail. 
One way to fill out the argument is to proceed in three stages. The first stage 
points out there must be some interesting and important psychological 
antecedents to perceptual demonstrative thought that explain how such 
thought comes about. These psychological antecedents must, for example, 
demonstrate, select or lock onto an object, in a way that allows the subject to 
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individuate and track the object, and in a way that determines which object the 
subject’s thought is about. These explanatory antecedents must, as it were, get 
the object ‘into’ the subject’s thought, in virtue of the subject’s perceptual 
relation to the object. In Campbell’s own terms these selective psychological 
antecedents to perceptual demonstrative thought provide us with ‘knowledge 
of reference’. The second stage of the argument points out that, if these 
psychological antecedents to perceptual demonstrative thought are to play this 
important explanatory role, then they must have a certain profile: they must be 
largely made up of selective mechanisms or processes. After all, we’ve said they 
must select or lock on to the object of thought, on the basis of the subject’s 
perceptual relation to the object, and determine which object, out of many, the 
subject’s thought is about. The third stage of the argument claims that 
conscious perceptual attention is the only promising candidate that fits this 
profile and can play this role. This is because it doesn’t seem possible to say that 
some conscious, personal level selective mechanism provides us with 
knowledge of reference in this way, but deny that thing is a form of conscious 
perceptual attention: it’s difficult to say what a conscious personal level 
mechanism that selects or locks onto particular objects, on the basis of a 
subject’s perceptual relation to those objects, could be if not a form of 
conscious perceptual attention. It’s reasonable to suggest that any conscious, 
personal level process or capacity that selects objects in this way would just be a 
form of conscious perceptual attention. So, the argument concludes that 
anyone who tries to reject [CT]*—e.g. the identity view—either: (a) fails to give 
a satisfactory account of what explains our capacities for perceptual 
demonstrative thought; or (b) ends up giving conscious perceptual attention an 
essential explanatory role with respect our perceptual demonstrative thoughts 
after all (and thus ends up accepting [CT]*). 
I suggest we should agree with most of what the explanatory demand argument 
is claiming here. But I also want to suggest there is a suppressed assumption or 
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premise at work in it. The suppressed assumption or premise is that the 
selective mechanisms or processes that play the role described in stage one of 
the argument are conscious mechanisms or processes that operate at the 
personal level. We should agree a form of conscious perceptual attention is the 
only conscious or personal level psychological phenomenon that could fit the 
profile described in stage two of the argument. But that’s not to say a form of 
conscious perceptual attention is the only psychological phenomenon that 
could fit this profile or play this role. If the selective psychological antecedents 
to perceptual demonstrative thought could consist only in unconscious 
mechanisms, which occur at the level of information-processing, then the 
argument fails. It would be possible to meet the explanatory demand without 
appeal to any form of conscious perceptual attention. So, I suggest, whether or 
not our explanatory demand argument works is going to turn on whether: 
(i) The selective psychological antecedents to perceptual demonstrative 
thought—those that provide us with knowledge of reference—must 
include conscious processes or mechanisms (in which case I’ve argued 
they must include some form of conscious perceptual attention and 
[CT]* seems inescapable); 
or whether: 
(ii) The selective psychological antecedents to perceptual demonstrative 
thought—those that provide us with knowledge of reference—could be 
made up of unconscious mechanisms which occur at the level of 
perceptual information-processing (in which case the explanatory 
demand argument is unsuccessful). 
Now it might be objected here that it is simply obvious that such subpersonal 
and unconscious mechanisms could not, on their own, provide us with 
anything worthy of the label knowledge of reference. It might be suggested 
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subpersonal and unconscious mechanisms are just the wrong kind of thing, 
occurring at the wrong level of explanation, to directly cause or constitute such 
knowledge. But I want to suggest this is not so. Recall that sometimes Campbell 
operates with a really rather thin or programmatic understanding of what 
knowledge of reference is. He often seems to give little more than a functional 
characterization: knowledge of reference is whatever causes and justifies the 
pattern of use we make with a term or concept. It seems that, as long as 
something plays this causing and justifying role, then the subject has 
knowledge of reference (see discussion in chapter 1, §4). I suggest that if this is 
all there is to knowledge of reference then it’s not at all obvious why this role 
could not be played by unconscious information-processing mechanisms. On 
the face of things, the fact that a determinate object has been selected in a 
subject’s perceptual system could cause and justify the pattern of use a subject 
makes with a perceptual demonstrative term or concept, given that, as a result 
of this selection, the subject’s pattern of use is suitably sensitive to how things 
are with that particular object.  
Now we also saw Campbell sometimes operates with a ‘thicker’ or more 
intuitive understanding of knowledge of reference; i.e. something closer to 
‘knowing which object a term or concept refers to’ in a colloquial or ordinary 
sense (see, e.g., 2002: 14). Perhaps it’s plausible that this kind of knowledge 
could not be caused or constituted by unconscious information-processing 
mechanisms. But the problem here is that, if Campbell wants to operate with 
this thicker notion of ‘knowledge of reference’ in his arguments, then we’d need 
from him: (a) some more precise account of exactly when we have this kind of 
knowledge (i.e. when we count as ‘knowing which’ object is in question); and 
(b) some argument that knowledge of reference in this sense really is necessary 
for perceptual demonstrative thought about an object. But I suggest we’ll get 
neither from Campbell. We saw he’s unwilling to say in detail what this kind of 
knowledge consists in, and, as we saw, there’s reason to think it’s extremely 
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difficult to give such an account or argument.38 So we can construct something 
of a dilemma for this objection. On one horn: if we operate with a the intuitive 
or colloquial construal of knowledge of reference, then it may be plausible that 
subpersonal, unconscious mechanisms could not, on their own, provide us 
with knowledge of reference. But it’s not obvious why we should think 
knowledge of reference (in this sense) really is required for perceptual 
demonstrative thought. On the other horn: if we operate with a ‘thin’, technical 
or functional construal of knowledge of reference, then it may be plausible that 
knowledge of reference really is required for perceptual demonstrative thought 
(again, see chapter 1, §4). But I suggested it’s not obvious why knowledge of 
reference (in this sense) could not be provided by something other than a form 
of conscious perceptual attention. So I submit this objection is unsuccessful: it’s 
really an open question whether knowledge of reference (properly understood) 
could be provided by unconscious information-processing mechanisms; we’d 
need some substantial argument if we were to be convinced this is not possible. 
In response to these kinds of points an objector might claim: Regardless of how 
we precisely formulate ‘knowledge of reference’, Campbell’s sea of faces case, 
discussed at length in chapter 2, already shows us that unconscious selective 
mechanisms are not sufficient for such knowledge of reference and can’t 
explain our abilities to think perceptual demonstrative thoughts. Recall that in 
the sea of faces case we stipulated that the subject H doesn’t consciously 
perceptually attend to the woman she is being asked about, but has the ability 
to answer questions about and act with respect to the woman. The natural 
                                                      
38 See discussion in chapter 1, §4. Recall that even Gareth Evans, who is a major proponent of 
‘knowing which’ requirements on thought about objects, admits the requirement is extremely 
difficult to make precise (1982: 89-92). Evans ends up construing ‘knowing which’ as having 
‘discriminating knowledge’. This means “the subject must have the capacity to distinguish the 
object of his judgement from all other things” (1982: 89). Detailed discussion of Evans would 
take us too far afield, but on the face of things it’s not obvious why this kind of practical 
discriminating capacity—e.g. the capacity to locate on object in space in the case of perceptual 
demonstrative thought—could not be provided by unconscious information-processing 
mechanisms.  
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explanation of H’s abilities here is that, somehow, her visual system has selected 
and locked onto the woman in question, and is feeding her information to 
inform her reports and set the parameters for her actions. But, we saw, it seems 
natural to think that H can’t think perceptual demonstrative thoughts about the 
woman in question. Doesn’t this already show us that unconscious selective 
mechanisms are not sufficient for the kind of knowledge necessary to think 
perceptual demonstrative thoughts? I suggest not. In chapter 2 I argued at some 
length that the sea of faces case doesn’t do enough to show that, in every case, 
knowledge of reference with respect to an object entails conscious perceptual 
attention to that object. So it doesn’t do enough, on its own, to show 
unconscious selective mechanisms are not sufficient for knowledge of reference. 
If that’s right, we’ll need to appeal to further considerations, beyond cases like 
the sea of faces case, if we want to make the explanatory demand argument 
work. 
The important result of this section is that those who reject the reformulation 
version of Campbell’s Thesis (i.e. [CT]*) are committed to holding that the 
selective psychological antecedents to perceptual demonstrative thought, which 
explain how we are able to latch onto perceived objects in thought, are 
unconscious information-processing mechanisms. The question I want to 
pursue in the remainder of this chapter is: What reason, if any, is there to think 
this commitment really is a problematic one? I’ll start by looking at what I 
think is Campbell’s own answer to this question (§2), and then I’ll start to 
develop my own answer (§§3-4). 
2. The targeting-setting argument 
I’ve just argued that those who reject [CT]* need to hold that the selective 
psychological antecedents to perceptual demonstrative thought are wholly 
made up of unconscious information-processing mechanisms, and that those 
who accept [CT]* will hold these psychological antecedents must include 
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conscious, personal level processes or capacities. I’ve suggested which position 
we should accept is likely to turn on these kinds of issues. But it’s important to 
note none of this entails those who accept [CT]* must deny unconscious 
information-processing mechanisms play an important and substantial role in 
explaining how we are able to latch onto objects in perceptual demonstrative 
thought. In fact, Campbell himself thinks such unconscious information-
processing mechanisms do most of the explanatory work here. As he’d put it, 
the procedures we use to verify and find the implications of propositions 
containing perceptual demonstrative terms are information-processing 
procedures in the visual system.39 His main aim is to convince us that conscious 
perceptual attention has an essential explanatory role to play despite this.  
The basic idea is that conscious perceptual attention sets the targets and 
objectives for the various information-processing procedures that feed into and 
make possible perceptual demonstrative thought. Campbell claims conscious 
perceptual attention determines which objects such information-processing 
operates on, and which information-processing procedures are used. The idea, 
roughly, is that without conscious perceptual attention, these information-
processing procedures wouldn’t ‘know’ which objects to operate on, nor how to 
operate on them (see especially 2002: 13-38). We can recast this idea as the 
claim that the selective psychological antecedents to perceptual demonstrative 
thought must include conscious personal level capacities and processes (i.e. 
                                                      
39 On Campbell’s view these information-processing procedures may be either: (a) complex 
computational procedures used to determine the ‘high-level’ properties of objects (e.g. whether 
one object is enclosed by another, where a falling object is going to land, whether there is a 
clear path between one object and another) (2002: 26-28); (b) simpler procedures used to 
access information about the ‘low-level’ sensory properties of objects which are detected in 
early vision (e.g. colour, shape, size, orientation, motion) (2002: 28-34). Campbell bases his 
discussion of these simpler procedures on aspects of Anne Treisman’s Feature Integration 
Theory (Treisman and Gelade 1980). But Campbell need not rely on the correctness of this 
theory; his picture could be reformulated within other frameworks (see, e.g., Campbell 2011a). 
In general these kinds of details aren’t important for our discussion; I’ll set them aside as far as 
possible in what follows. 
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must include conscious perceptual attention), which is precisely the claim we 
need to make the explanatory demand argument work. 
Campbell’s main argument for his target-setting account begins with the 
following hypothesis: 
The Causal Hypothesis: When, on the basis of vision, you answer the 
question, ‘Is that thing F?’, what causes the selection of the relevant 
information to control your verbal response is your conscious attention to 
the thing referred to (2002: 13).  
This hypothesis is about visually-based verbal responses to questions involving 
a demonstrative expression. But I presume it is also supposed to hold with 
respect to perceptual demonstrative thought. If you are to understand and 
answer the question ‘Is that thing F?’ on the basis of vision then presumably, in 
most ordinary cases, you will have to think a perceptual demonstrative thought 
about that thing and then make some perceptual demonstrative judgement 
about it. So, at the level of thought, which is what concerns us here, a broadly 
parallel causal hypothesis might say something like: 
When you make the perceptual demonstrative judgement ‘That thing is 
F’ what causes the selection of the relevant information-processing to 
control, guide and make possible your judgment, is (some form of) 
conscious perceptual attention to that object. 
Why should we accept this kind of causal hypothesis? Campbell thinks it is 
supported by some counterfactual claims about the relations between conscious 
perceptual attention, information-processing, and perceptual demonstrative 
thought (2002: 13). We have counterfactuals such as: 
[CF1] If your conscious perceptual attention had been directed 
elsewhere (for example, at a different object), then your perceptual 
demonstrative judgement would have been controlled, guided and fed 
by different information and by different information-processing 
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procedures. 
[CF2] In any case in which you consciously perceptually attend to the 
same object, in the same way, your perceptual demonstrative judgement 
would be controlled, guided and fed by just the same information and 
by just the same information-processing procedures. 
Campbell’s claim is that the causal hypothesis explains why these 
counterfactuals are true and that for this reason we should accept the causal 
hypothesis (2002: 13-14ff.). 
There are two questions we need to ask to assess this argument. First: Should 
we accept counterfactuals such as [CF1] and [CF2]? Second: Are there other 
good explanations of why counterfactuals such as [CF1] and [CF2] hold which 
are incompatible with Campbell’s causal hypothesis? 
Let us accept the counterfactuals are plausible. We saw in chapter 2 that there 
seem to be very intimate links—i.e. some correlations—between certain forms 
of conscious perceptual attention, perceptual demonstrative thought, and the 
kind of identificatory knowledge necessary to think a perceptual demonstrative 
thought. So there are probably also very close links—i.e. some correlations—
between certain forms of conscious perceptual attention and the information-
processing procedures that underpin perceptual demonstrative thought.  
However, with respect to the second question, it does seem that there are other 
explanations of the truth of counterfactuals such as [CF1] and [CF2] that are 
incompatible with the causal hypothesis. For example, some versions of the 
identity view discussed in chapter 2 are incompatible with the causal hypothesis. 
This is because perceptual demonstrative thought—which, according to some 
versions of the identity view, just is the form of conscious perceptual attention 
at issue here—cannot itself cause the kind of selection of information that 
makes possible perceptual demonstrative thought: whatever causes this 
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selection must, presumably, be causally and explanatorily prior to perceptual 
demonstrative thought itself. But, despite being incompatible with the causal 
hypothesis, the identity view could explain why counterfactuals such as [CF1] 
and [CF2] hold. Presumably there must be a correlation between which object 
or objects your perceptual demonstrative thought is about, and which 
information-processing procedures control, guide and feed your perceptual 
demonstrative thought. So equally, according to the identity view, there will be 
some correlations between which object you consciously perceptually attend to 
and which information-processing procedures control, guide and feed your 
perceptual demonstrative thought. These kinds of correlations could explain 
why counterfactuals such as [CF1] and [CF2] hold.  
Given this, why might we prefer the explanation given by Campbell’s causal 
hypothesis? To make progress here we might ask: If not a form of conscious 
perceptual attention, then what causes and explains the selection of suitable 
information, to guide, control and feed your perceptual demonstrative thought, 
such that your thought is connected to the relevant information-processing? 
Surely something must do so. Now if the identity theorist appealed to a 
conscious selective process or capacity here, then it’s difficult to see what this 
process or capacity could be, if not a form of conscious perceptual attention 
(see the argument in §1 above). So the identity theorist who rejects [CT] will 
need to say this role is played by some unconscious selective information-
processing mechanism. But Campbell tries to block this kind of answer. He 
writes:  
you might accept that there is a serious question: ‘How does it come about 
that the firing of cells in V4 is connected to your verbal response?’ [or ‘How 
does it come about that information-processing in the perceptual system is 
connected to your perceptual demonstrative judgement?’].[40] But, you might 
                                                      
40 In chapter 1 of Reference and Consciousness Campbell switches between making his points at 
the level of information-processing and at the level of cell-firings in the visual cortex, and also 
between the level of language (verbal report) and the level of thought. I’ll stick to talking about 
information-processing and thought. 
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say, the cause of there being this connection is not conscious attention to the 
relevant object. It is, rather, a further information-processing mechanism. To 
this objection we must immediately concede that there are illuminating 
information-processing models of the executive control of mental processes 
… But at the highest level of determining the objectives of the subject, there 
simply is no alternative to appealing to the beliefs and intentions of the agent, 
and that includes the demonstrative beliefs and intentions of the agent. If we 
were blocked from appealing to the agent's intentions, we would simply have 
no idea where to begin in giving a model of control of the agent's mental 
operations. But what I have just been arguing is that an appeal to the agent's 
demonstrative intentions requires us to appeal to the agent's conscious 
attention to objects; we cannot acknowledge a role for intention, in the 
control of mental operations, without thereby acknowledging a role for 
conscious attention. We may have to appeal to the deepest aspects of an 
agent's personal life in explaining why his conscious attention has just the 
focus that it does, and we have no way of recasting this causal-explanatory 
work in information-processing terms (2002: 13-14).  
There’s a lot going on in this passage. But as I understand things, the main 
thought here is there is a general problem or puzzle about how information-
processing in our perceptual systems could be sensitive and responsive to our 
personal level beliefs and intentions, such that we can get our perceptual 
systems to provide us with the information we want, when we want it, about 
the objects we are interested in, so as to successfully and flexibly guide thought 
and action. The thought seems to be we must appeal to some form of conscious 
perceptual attention to, as it were, provide a bridge between the personal level 
and subpersonal level if we are to explain how this is possible, and that 
appealing to some further selective information-processing mechanisms won’t 
do. 41 As such, Campbell thinks those who deny the causal hypothesis will have 
                                                      
41 There’s also a tricky and highly compact point about intentions with demonstrative content 
in the passage quoted above. As far as I understand it the point seems to be: if we are to explain 
how information-processing is to feed and make possible perceptual demonstrative thought, 
then such information-processing needs to be sensitive to the subject’s prior beliefs and 
intentions. Not only this, but it needs to be sensitive to prior beliefs and intentions of the 
subject that already have demonstrative content. I find it difficult to see how this could be so 
without our reaching a regress, such that any conceptual state with demonstrative content (e.g. 
any demonstrative thought) must be explained by a prior conceptual state with demonstrative 
content (e.g. an intention with demonstrative content), which in turn must be explained by 
some prior conceptual state with demonstrative content, and so on… Also note it doesn’t seem 
that appeal to conscious perceptual attention will, in any straightforward way, help us break the 
regress. If any conceptual state with demonstrative content must be explained by a prior 
conceptual state with demonstrative content, then we face a regress regardless of whether a 
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to claim that: 
information-processing systems in the human being … are insulated from 
the kinds of psychological phenomena familiar to common sense. [And] that 
the dynamics of the two systems, information-processing and ordinary 
consciousness, are independent (2002: 26). 
But, Campbell claims: 
that would be a mistake. Which information-processing we perform is not 
somehow isolated from the explicit objectives that we have, the tasks that we 
want to carry out. Which information we process, and how, depends in part 
on what we are up to, what our objectives are … The concept of conscious 
attention thus plays a role here in connecting our psychology, at the level 
described by common-sense, with the information-processing described by 
psychologists (2002: 26-27). 
We should definitely agree it would be a mistake to say that, in general, which 
information-processing we perform is isolated from our personal level beliefs 
and intentions. Plausibly we need to allow for ‘top-down’ control of 
information-processing by personal level states like beliefs and intentions. The 
key question is: Why should we think it must be some form of conscious 
perceptual attention that connects or bridges information-processing and our 
personal level beliefs and intentions? Why couldn’t some selective information-
processing mechanisms, which just are sensitive and responsive to our personal 
level beliefs and intentions, account for the fact that which information we 
process depends on what we are up to and what our objectives are? 
I want to argue it’s not true, in general, that we must appeal to a form of 
conscious perceptual attention if we are to account for how information-
processing in our perceptual systems can be responsive and sensitive to our 
personal level beliefs and intentions. There appear to be cases in which 
                                                                                                                                              
form of conscious perceptual attention plays some role in explaining how such conceptual 
states come to have demonstrative content. (Although, to be fair to Campbell, this regress may 
only appear if we transpose the passage, as I have done, from the level of language and verbal 
report to the level of thought. But if the point only concerns language and verbal report, then it 
need not concern us in this thesis). 
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information-processing in our perceptual systems can be responsive and 
sensitive in this kind of way, without conscious perceptual attention playing 
any mediating, bridging or target-setting role. If that’s right, we don’t need to 
appeal to a form of conscious perceptual attention to solve the very general 
problem or puzzle Campbell has set up for us. We can point to two examples 
here: 
[1] Subjects with blindsight have no (or very limited) visual experience in large 
regions of their visual fields (called a scotoma), due to damage to the primary 
visual cortex. Nonetheless, surprisingly, blindsight patients can reliably guess, 
when asked or prompted to, various facts about bits of their environment of 
which they have no visual experience. For example, one might place a bar in a 
blindsight patient’s scotoma and ask her to report whether the bar has a 
horizontal or vertical orientation. The subject will probably insist she cannot 
answer because she cannot see the bar in question. Yet when asked to guess, the 
subject will often guess accurately (see Weiskrantz 2009 for a recent and 
comprehensive review). In fact some blindsight patients can make much more 
fine-grained and complex discriminations than this. For example blindsight 
patient DB can reliably classify line drawings of animals presented in his 
scotoma (e.g. by species), even without being asked to choose from a range of 
options (Trevethan et al. 2007). Now, presumably making these kinds of 
discriminations and guesses requires exploiting various information-processing 
procedures in the blindsight patient’s perceptual system. And, presumably, to 
enable these kinds of discriminations and guesses such information-processing 
and information selection must be, to some extent, responsive and sensitive to 
the patient’s personal level beliefs and intentions (e.g. her understanding of her 
experimenter’s instructions, and her intentions to follow these instructions). So 
it seems reasonable to suggest that we have here a case of information-
processing in a subject’s perceptual system being responsive and sensitive to 
the subject’s personal level beliefs or intentions. But, in the case of blindsight, 
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this responsiveness and sensitivity seems to occur without any form of 
conscious perceptual attention playing any bridging or target-setting role. It is 
natural to think blindsight patients cannot deploy any form of conscious 
perceptual attention to objects that fall within their scotomas in these kinds of 
experiments, and so natural to think no form of conscious perceptual attention 
plays an explanatory role with respect to their abilities to guess in these kinds of 
experiments.42  
[2] We can also give a non-pathological example. Vision science tells us we 
usually make saccadic eye-movements around four to five times a second.43 
Vision scientists think certain selective mechanisms are importantly implicated 
in selectively targeting, planning and executing such saccades. The picture is 
that these mechanisms select the potential target of a saccade, before the 
saccade takes place, to allow the oculomotor system to process some 
preliminary information about its target and thereby properly lock onto and 
execute a movement to its target.44 Now, in some cases, which patterns of 
saccadic eye movements we make is determined ‘top-down’ by our personal 
level intentions and beliefs (e.g. by the perceptual goals we take ourselves to 
have, what we’ve been instructed to do, etc.).45 So the way in which the selective 
information-processing involved in saccade-planning takes place must also be 
determined ‘top-down’ by our personal level beliefs and intentions. So it seems 
reasonable to suggest we have here another case in which information-
processing in a subject’s perceptual system is, to some extent, responsive and 
sensitive to the subject’s personal level beliefs and intentions, in virtue of the 
operation of certain selective mechanisms. But it doesn’t seem that, in this case, 
                                                      
42 Although note there is some experimental evidence that some form of unconscious attention 
is deployed in these kinds of experimental tasks; see Kentridge 2011 for a recent review and 
further references. 
43 For a summary of the science of eye-movements see Palmer 1999: 520-531ff. 
44 See Hoffman 1998 or Pashler 1998: 80-85 for reviews and further references. 
45 See Yarbus 1967 for some classic and striking examples involving early use of eye trackers. 
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a form of conscious perceptual attention is required to connect or bridge the 
level of information-processing and personal level psychological states. The 
kind of selective mechanism involved in saccade-planning seems to be distinct 
from the kinds of conscious perceptual attention under consideration here, 
which involve conscious selection or highlighting of objects in experience. I say 
this partly because we are probably completely unaware of the majority of the 
saccades we make, let alone the planning or targeting of them. So whatever the 
selective mechanism involved in such saccade-planning is (it’s sometimes 
described as a form of attention; see Hoffman 1998), it doesn’t seem to be a 
form of conscious perceptual attention. As such, it’s reasonable to suggest it 
would be a mistake to say a form of conscious perceptual attention is involved 
in all cases of such ‘top-down’ saccade-planning, and a mistake to say that, in 
this case, conscious perceptual attention is required for perceptual 
information-processing to be responsive and sensitive to the subject’s personal 
level beliefs and intentions. 
The point here is merely it doesn’t seem true that, in general, we must appeal to 
a form of conscious perceptual attention if we are to account for how 
information-processing in our perceptual systems can be responsive and 
sensitive to our personal level beliefs and intentions: we can sometimes, at least, 
appeal to unconscious selective mechanisms instead. If that’s right, then the 
version of Campbell’s target-setting argument I presented above fails. Those 
who reject the causal hypothesis and deny any form of conscious perceptual 
attention plays Campbell’s target-setting role will not be forced to claim ‘which 
perceptual information-processing we carry out is insulated from the kinds of 
psychological phenomena familiar to common sense, and that the movements 
of the two systems are independent’. 
It might be objected that Campbell really wants to set up a more specific 
problem or puzzle here; namely, a problem about how the information-
processing that makes possible specifically perceptual demonstrative thought, 
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rather than perceptual information-processing in general, can be responsive to 
our personal level beliefs and intentions. That is to say, it might be objected 
that Campbell is only trying to claim that, specifically in the case of perceptual 
demonstrative thought, we must say a form of conscious perceptual attention 
plays the target-setting role, if we want to explain how this responsiveness is 
possible. In response to this objection we can ask: Given that in general we 
don’t need to appeal to any form of conscious perceptual attention to explain 
how perceptual information-processing can be responsive to our personal level 
beliefs and intentions, why do we need to appeal to a form of conscious 
perceptual attention in the case of perceptual demonstrative thought? What 
exactly is wrong with saying the selective target-setting role is played by 
unconscious mechanisms that just are responsive in these ways? I think it’s 
difficult to find answers to these specific questions from Campbell. The 
following passage is the closest I can find: 
The question, for someone who proposes that all the causal-explanatory 
work in controlling their verbal response [i.e. a visually-based verbal 
response involving a demonstrative term] is achieved at the information-
processing level, is whether we can give an account, in purely information-
processing terms, of the distinction between knowing which thing is 
referred to by the demonstrative and not knowing which thing is referred 
to by the demonstrative. As we saw [presumably on the basis of 
consideration of cases like the sea of faces case], common sense draws that 
distinction by asking whether the subject has consciously singled out the 
reference of the demonstrative. We have simply no way of getting the effect 
of that distinction in purely information-processing terms (2002: 14). 
There seem to be two points here. First: it’s just intuitively plausible or 
compelling to commonsense that unconscious information-processing 
mechanisms are not the kind of thing that could provide knowledge of 
reference. Second: consideration of cases like the sea of faces case backs up this 
intuitive point. However I hope it’s clear these kinds of points are just 
retreading old ground and lack dialectical force here. This is because I’ve 
already argued that: (a) it is not obvious knowledge of reference (properly 
understood) cannot be provided by unconscious information-processing 
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mechanisms (see this chapter, §1); (b) cases like the sea of faces case don’t, by 
themselves, do enough to show this is implausible (at least, given certain 
assumptions about the disunity of conscious perceptual attention; see chapter 
2).  
If that’s right, and if it’s right to think we’re not going to find any further 
arguments from Campbell on these points, then Campbell’s target-setting 
argument is unsuccessful. In fact it’s probably more accurate to claim only that 
the argument is unsuccessful in the present dialectical context. I say this 
because I’d like to stress that if we were already convinced that a form of 
conscious perceptual attention plays an essential explanatory role with respect 
to our perceptual demonstrative thoughts—as Campbell probably thinks we 
should be, on the basis of his sea of faces argument—then the target-setting 
argument gives us a neat account of exactly how this could be so. In particular, 
it gives a neat account of how this could be so even if we accept, as we probably 
should, that much of the explanatory work with respect to our perceptual 
demonstrative thoughts is carried out by unconscious mechanisms in 
perceptual information-processing. Campbell’s target-setting account shows us 
how explanations at the level of consciousness and explanations at the level of 
information-processing need not be in competition here, and that we need not 
worry conscious perceptual attention is just an epiphenomena of the 
underlying information-processing (such that we could give the whole 
explanatory story without mentioning conscious phenomena at all). Campbell 
shows us how the explanatory role of conscious perceptual attention need not 
be usurped by perceptual information-processing, and how conscious, personal 
level phenomena can do genuine explanatory work by providing a kind of 
‘framing-condition’ for the explanatory work done by perceptual information-
processing. 
There’s definitely much to be admired about this kind of account. That said, if 
we are not already convinced that a form of conscious perceptual attention 
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plays an explanatory role with respect to our perceptual demonstrative 
thoughts, then I hope to have argued Campbell’s target-setting argument gives 
us little reason to think a form of conscious perceptual attention actually does 
play this target-setting role. Another way to put this point is that Campbell’s 
argument gives us little reason to think that the selective psychological 
antecedents to perceptual demonstrative thought must include more than 
unconscious mechanisms which occur at the level of information-processing. It 
was this claim I suggested we needed to defend to make the explanatory 
demand argument from §1 work.  
However, I want to suggest in the next couple of sections that we may be able to 
develop an alternative, more promising argument on the basis of the 
explanatory demand discussed in §1.  
3. An alternative argument 
Stepping back for a moment, I think we can begin to see that an important part 
of what is causing trouble for Campbell’s arguments—or rather my 
reconstructions of them—is their reliance on Campbell’s rather slippery notion 
of ‘knowledge of reference’. As I mentioned above: on the one hand, if we 
operate with the ‘thick’ or intuitive construal of this notion, then it’s unclear 
why we should think knowledge of reference should be required for perceptual 
demonstrative thought. On the other hand, if we operate with the ‘thin’, 
technical or functional construal of knowledge of reference, it can be unclear 
why knowledge of reference could not be provided by something other than a 
form of conscious perceptual attention. If that’s the right way to look at our 
discussion throughout a lot of chapters 2 and 3, then we should aim, at this 
point, to consider whether it’s possible to develop an argument that doesn’t rely 
upon the notion of ‘knowledge of reference’. With this in mind, I want to 
explore and develop an alternative argument for [CT]* that builds on the 
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explanatory demand from §1, but which relies very little on the notion of 
‘knowledge of reference’. The argument has two stages: 
The first stage claims that it’s not possible to take different attitudes towards 
[CT]* and the following explanatory claim: 
[E] Conscious perceptual experience has an explanatory role to play with 
respect to our capacities to think perceptual demonstrative thoughts about 
objects. 
The second stage claims it is highly implausible to reject [E]. It claims [E] is 
something of a datum, which it would be costly and unattractive to give up. If 
both stages of the argument were cogent, then we should accept [CT]*. I’ll 
discuss the first stage of the argument in the remainder of this section. In §4 I’ll 
turn to the second stage. To look ahead: I’m going to claim this argument is 
more promising than Campbell’s own development of the explanatory demand 
argument (i.e. his target-setting argument) and that it reveals some of the 
substantial commitments anyone who rejects [CT]* must take on. However I’m 
not going to take a stand on whether the argument’s second stage is ultimately 
successful. 
Why think it’s not possible to take different attitudes towards [CT]* and [E]? 
Well we saw in §1 of this chapter that rejecting [CT]* commits one to the claim 
that the selective psychological antecedents to perceptual demonstrative 
thought are made up only of unconscious mechanisms which occur at the level 
of information-processing. This means one is committed to claiming that it is 
only unconscious information-processing mechanisms that select and lock 
onto objects in order to make possible perceptual demonstrative thought about 
those objects. Also that it is only unconscious information-processing 
mechanisms that individuate, delineate and track objects, on the basis of the 
subject’s perceptual relation to those objects, in order to determine which 
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object the subject’s thought is about. Now since those who reject [CT]* are 
committed to claiming the objects of perceptual demonstrative thought are 
individuated, selected and tracked at the level of unconscious information-
processing (with conscious perceptual phenomena playing no role), I suggest 
they will also be committed to claiming it is unconscious information-
processing mechanisms that feed the subject perceptual information about 
selected objects, so as to guide and control the content of the subject’s 
perceptual demonstrative thought. I say this because it doesn’t seem as if those 
who reject [CT]* can, as it were, have things both ways and simultaneously 
claim that:  
(a) Conscious perceptual phenomena (e.g. perceptual experience) play 
some role in guiding and controlling the content of the subject’s 
perceptual demonstrative thought and some role in determining what 
the subject thinks about the objects of perceptual demonstrative 
thought. 
(b) The objects of perceptual demonstrative thought are individuated, 
selected and tracked only at the level of unconscious information-
processing mechanisms, and not at the level of conscious perceptual 
phenomena (i.e. by conscious perceptual attention). 
But if that’s right then notice so much of the explanatory work with respect to 
perceptual demonstrative thought has now been taken up by unconscious 
information-processing mechanisms, that it’s very difficult to see how there 
could be room for conscious experience to play an explanatory role. Any 
explanatory role we might have thought conscious experience could play looks 
to have been handed over to unconscious information-processing mechanisms 
(e.g. delineating and individuating objects for the subject; enabling subjects to 
keep track of objects over time; controlling and guiding the content of the 
subject’s thought). As we might put things, it looks as if the claim that the 
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selective psychological antecedents to perceptual demonstrative thought are 
wholly made up of unconscious information-processing mechanisms forces 
one to claim that basically all the explanatory psychological antecedents to 
perceptual demonstrative thought are unconscious information-processing 
mechanisms.46 And if that’s right, then anyone who rejects [CT]* is lumbered 
with a commitment that squeezes conscious experience out of explanations of 
our capacities to think perceptual demonstrative thoughts about objects. As 
such, I suggest it’s very difficult to see how anyone who rejects [CT]* could 
hold onto [E]. (So I suggest we should accept the first stage of the argument 
outlined at the beginning of this section). 
How might someone who rejects [CT]* respond to these accusations? Well 
they might try to adapt a neat move that Campbell himself makes. As we saw at 
the end of §2 of this chapter, when it looks as if any explanatory role for 
conscious psychological phenomena has been handed over to or usurped by 
information-processing mechanisms, Campbell’s move is to claim that 
conscious psychological phenomena act as a kind of ‘framing-condition’ for 
information-processing mechanisms and, as such, make it possible for such 
information-processing to operate in the appropriate way. So we might try and 
claim perceptual experience acts as a kind of framing-condition for some of the 
information-processing that those who reject [CT]* are committed to saying 
explain our capacities for perceptual demonstrative thought. In this way we 
might argue conscious perceptual experience does genuine explanatory work 
here. However, I think it’s very difficult to see how Campbell’s move could be 
adapted to work in the case at issue here. One way to look at Campbell’s own 
picture is as follows: Conscious experience of objects provides a framing-
condition for and makes possible conscious perceptual attention to objects; e.g. 
it provides an array from which conscious perceptual attention can select 
                                                      
46 An exception might be the personal level beliefs and intentions of the subject that such 
information-processing must probably be sensitive and responsive to (see discussion in §2 of 
this chapter). 
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particular objects. Then, in turn, conscious perceptual attention sets the targets 
for, guides and instructs the relevant information-processing mechanisms (see 
discussion in §2 of this chapter). But, crucially, if we cut conscious perceptual 
attention out of this picture then I suggest it’s very difficult to see how or why 
these unconscious information-processing mechanisms would really require 
perceptual experience of objects to play any such framing role. I think a key 
point here is that if we hold all the selective psychological antecedents to 
perceptual demonstrative thought are unconscious information-processing 
mechanisms, then we thereby give unconscious information-processing a 
certain degree of autonomy, such that it’s mysterious what framing-role 
conscious experience of objects could be required to play. 
I’m not going to be able to establish it’s absolutely impossible for any position 
that rejects [CT]* to hold onto [E] here. But I do hope to have given some 
reason to think that it’s difficult to see how they could do so. If it’s right to 
think that they cannot do so, then we end up with what I think is quite a 
significant result. The result is that those who reject [CT]* are committed to 
denying conscious perceptual experience of objects plays any explanatory role 
with respect to our perceptual demonstrative thoughts about those objects. 
This result is significant because this is a substantive and, on the face of things, 
quite radical and revisionary commitment. It is also significant because, as 
we’ve seen, there’s something difficult and a bit mysterious about the notion of 
conscious perceptual attention. It seems to straddle a number of apparently 
diverse conscious capacities, processes and activities that are somewhat familiar 
to ordinary introspection and our commonsense psychology, and which are, in 
some complex way, related to a range of phenomena intensively studied by 
empirical psychology and neuroscience. We’ve seen there are question marks 
over how unified these diverse conscious capacities, processes and activities are, 
and also over exactly what relation they bear to the phenomena studied by 
psychologists and neuroscientists. As such, it seems reasonable to suggest it 
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may be easier to argue that perceptual experience plays an explanatory role with 
respect to our perceptual demonstrative thoughts, than it would be to directly 
argue that conscious perceptual attention plays such an explanatory role. Our 
result from this section would allow us to argue for the reformulated version of 
Campbell’s Thesis (i.e. [CT]*) by focusing on the former explanatory claim, 
which may be weaker and easier to handle. 
The key questions to consider next, in order to build on the result from this 
section, and to assess the second stage of the argument introduced in this 
section, are as follows: Can Campbell’s opponents legitimately deny that 
conscious perceptual experience of objects plays any explanatory role with 
respect to our perceptual demonstrative thoughts about those objects? How 
costly is this commitment? What other commitments does it lead to? 
4. The explanatory role of conscious perceptual experience 
Settling these issues in any definite way would probably take a whole thesis in 
itself. But in this final section I’ll explore why we might think it would be 
unattractive to deny conscious perceptual experience plays an explanatory role 
with respect to our perceptual demonstrative thoughts, and what the costs and 
further commitments associated with this denial are likely to be. 
In fact, there are several argumentative strategies we could pursue if we wanted 
to try to establish it would be unattractive to deny this. One strategy would be 
to try and argue there are epistemic conditions on perceptual demonstrative 
thought, and also that, given the special epistemic properties of conscious 
perceptual experience, we can only meet these conditions if we consciously 
experience the objects of perceptual demonstrative thought (see, e.g., Smithies 
2011b). If this were so then conscious experience must play some explanatory 
role with respect to our abilities to think perceptual demonstrative thoughts. 
One problem with this strategy is that it seems to come close to re-introducing 
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a notion of ‘knowledge of reference’ into our discussion. I suggested above (§3) 
that we should try and avoid doing this since knowledge of reference caused 
serious difficulty for both Campbell’s sea of faces argument, and his target-
setting argument. As such, I’ll set this strategy aside.  
A second strategy could try and develop and defend what would probably be 
Campbell’s own approach to these issues. Campbell, I think, would claim that 
conscious experience of objects is the only thing that can explain how we come 
to have a conception of objects as ‘categorical entities’, rather than as mere 
‘bundles of dispositions’ (i.e. entities that behave thus and so when acted on 
thus and so, somewhat like the unobservable entities posited in theoretical 
physics).47 The idea here is that only conscious experience presents or confronts 
us with categorical objects, and that any creature who completely lacked 
conscious experience of objects could only conceive of objects as ‘bundles of 
dispositions’. Campbell would go on to claim this means that: if we want to 
explain how we are able to conceive of objects as categorical entities, then we 
will be committed to saying we are able to think some of our most basic 
thoughts about objects—which Campbell would consider to include perceptual 
demonstrative thoughts—partly on the basis of conscious experience of those 
objects. Now this strategy may be promising. There’s certainly something 
intuitive about the idea that a creature who completely lacked conscious 
perceptual experience could at best conceive of objects as bundles of 
dispositions, like the unobservable entities posited in theoretical physics, 
because they, in some sense, have never ‘confronted’ objects in experience. And 
there’s also something intuitive about the idea that this suggests it is experience 
of objects that explains how we are able to conceive of objects as categorical 
entities. But I think it can be difficult to see how we could decisively argue that 
                                                      
47 See Campbell 2002 (esp. chapters 5 and 6). Note that Campbell primarily uses this point to 
argue for a relational (as opposed to representationalist or sensational) account of visual 
experience; but he does also use the point to argue conscious experience must have a causal or 
explanatory role with respect to perceptual demonstrative thought (see, e.g., 2004, 2002: 132-
140ff.).  
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this is so. And even if we accepted these ideas, it can be difficult to see how we 
could safely make the move from these ideas to the claim we need here: that if 
we denied conscious experience plays some explanatory role with respect to 
specifically our perceptual demonstrative thoughts about objects, then it would 
be impossible to explain how we are able to conceive of objects as categorical 
entities, and as more than mere bundles of dispositions. For example, for this 
move to work we’d probably need to defend some very strong and substantive 
claims that perceptual demonstrative thoughts and concepts are truly 
fundamental in our conceptual development. So rather than pursue this second 
strategy any further here, I want to focus discussion on a third, somewhat 
simpler argumentative strategy. 
The third strategy starts with the observation that our ordinary or 
commonsense understanding of how we are able to think about objects on the 
basis of perception seems deeply committed to conscious perceptual experience 
playing an important explanatory role. We might suggest it seems to us that 
when we think perceptual demonstrative thoughts about objects in our 
surroundings, we are able to do so because our visual experience presents us 
with those objects and individuates them for us (see, e.g., Roessler 2009: 1036-
1037ff.). But why think this is really so? Well there are two issues here. First: 
Why think commonsense is really deeply committed or properly takes a stand 
on these issues? Why think we really do take ourselves to understand how we’re 
able to think perceptual demonstrative thoughts about objects, and that we’re 
not just largely neutral on this issue? Second: Even if we agreed we had some 
ordinary or commonsense understanding of how we’re able to think perceptual 
demonstrative thoughts about objects, why think this understanding gives 
specifically conscious perceptual experience an explanatory role? 
With regard to the first issue: I want to suggest there is something particularly 
perspicuous or highly intelligible about our capacities to think perceptual 
demonstrative thoughts, such that we take ourselves to understand how we’re 
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able to do what we’re able to do when we think perceptual demonstrative 
thoughts. Such highly intelligible capacities might be contrasted with more 
surprising or less intelligible capacities. For example, consider the capacity 
some of us have to return a powerful tennis serve. This presumably involves 
predicting where the ball will land, how it will bounce, how much spin there is 
on the ball, how powerfully the ball needs to be hit to make it back over the net, 
etc.; and all this needs to be done within a few tenths of a second. It’s 
reasonable to suggest that this is, in some ways, a highly surprising capacity, 
such that we don’t really understand how we’re able to return a powerful tennis 
serve, or what we really do when we do so. Or we might consider the capacity 
some of us have to recall obscure and half-forgotten facts, dates and names, 
such that we can get them to just ‘pop into our heads’ more or less on demand. 
It’s reasonable to suggest that those who are able to do this kind of thing don’t 
really understand how they’re able to do it, or what they’re really doing when 
they do it. In this sense this is a surprising capacity. But, I suggest, our 
capacities to think perceptual demonstrative thoughts about objects seem to be 
importantly different. One explanation of this difference is that, unlike in the 
case of the surprising capacities, we really do take ourselves to understand how 
we’re able to think perceptual demonstrative thoughts about objects, and we 
really do take ourselves to understand what we do when we do so. That is to say, 
one explanation of this difference is that commonsense psychology really takes 
a stand on what explains our capacities for perceptual demonstrative thought.  
With regard to the second issue: I want to suggest that if it’s right to think we 
really do have some substantial commonsense understanding of our capacities 
to think perceptual demonstrative thoughts, and that this capacity is readily 
intelligible to us, then it’s natural to think this commonsense understanding 
must give experience of objects a significant explanatory role. There are at least 
two reasons it doesn’t seem right to say we genuinely take ourselves to 
understand how we’re able to think perceptual demonstrative thoughts about 
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objects, but that that understanding doesn’t give experience an explanatory 
role: (1) We would naturally think that any creature who was able to think 
about objects on the basis of perception, but who lacked conscious perceptual 
experience of those objects, must be thinking about objects in a very different 
way to the way in which we think perceptual demonstrative thoughts about 
objects. This might suggest we ordinarily think that specifically perceptual 
experience plays an important explanatory or enabling role with respect to our 
perceptual demonstrative thoughts about objects. (2) Philosophical debates 
about the nature of perceptual experience appear to be premised on the idea 
that it really matters whether we conceive of perceptual experience as (say) 
relating us to sense-data, or as a state with representational content, or as a 
direct relation to ordinary objects and their properties. One explanation of this 
fact is that it is very natural for us to think the nature of perceptual experience 
has some interesting explanatory pay-off with respect to our thoughts and 
judgements about objects (including, paradigmatically, our perceptual 
demonstrative thoughts and judgements). We might think it would be difficult 
to see why these debates should seem so important or interesting if we didn’t, 
to some extent, ordinarily think that specifically perceptual experience has some 
significant explanatory role with respect to our perceptual demonstrative 
thoughts about objects. 
If all this is right then we reach the following result: Our ordinary or 
commonsense understanding of how we are able to think about objects on the 
basis of perception really is committed to conscious perceptual experience 
playing an important explanatory role. And if my arguments in §3 of this 
chapter are correct, this result means those who reject [CT]* are committed to 
claiming our commonsense understanding of how we are able to think 
perceptual demonstrative thoughts is quite radically mistaken. But, of course, 
the commonsense psychology of perceptual demonstrative thought is not 
immune to criticism. Establishing that our commonsense explanations give 
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conscious experience a significant explanatory role here doesn’t establish that 
conscious experience in fact plays such a role. It could be that these 
commonsense explanations are just confabulations: to suppose the actual 
explanation of our capacities to think perceptual demonstrative thoughts 
should match up with our naïve, commonsense explanations might be mere 
wishful thinking. In fact, we can point to some interesting empirical examples 
to back up these points. We might reasonably think the commonsense 
explanation of how we are able to reach for, grasp, and point to objects in our 
environments is that we are able to do so on the basis of, and guided by, our 
conscious experience of the spatial properties of those objects. It’s reasonable to 
suggest it seems to us that conscious experience of spatial properties explains 
these capacities (and also that these capacities are readily intelligible or 
perspicuous in the sense described above). But some interesting and famous 
experiments suggest these commonsense explanations may just be 
confabulations. In the experiments subjects are presented with an object and 
are asked to point to, reach for or grip it. The experimenters discovered that if 
the object is moved during a saccadic-eye movement, then it turns out subjects 
will sometimes adjust their pointing, reach or grip to compensate for this 
movement despite not reporting any awareness of the object’s movement 
(Goodale et al. 1986; Pélisson et al. 1986; Bridgeman et al. 1975). We might 
think this suggests it is not conscious experience of spatial properties that 
explains and accounts for the targeting of these actions, but rather mechanisms 
in the visuomotor system that track the spatial properties of objects more 
accurately than conscious experience.48 If it’s right to think this shows these 
commonsense explanations are confabulations, why should we hold onto our 
commonsense explanations of perceptual demonstrative thought, which give 
conscious experience a significant explanatory role? 
                                                      
48 For some similar striking examples (that are somewhat more complex because they involve a 
visual illusion, and probably require some discussion of illusory visual experience) see Goodale 
1996; Aglioti et al. 1995. See Campbell 2002: 51-53 for some philosophical discussion. 
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We could ask the following question to try and make progress here: Are there 
any significant costs associated with the idea that our commonsense 
explanations of perceptual demonstrative thought are confabulations? Here’s 
one reason to think we could give a positive answer to this question (there may 
be other reasons I won’t explore here): If it turned out that the commonsense 
psychology of perceptual demonstrative thought were radically mistaken, then 
this may have some unattractive consequences for the epistemology of 
perception. To see why this might be so, note it’s reasonable to suggest that 
perceptual demonstrative thought is, in some sense, fundamental in the 
epistemology of perception, and that many of our most basic non-inferential 
perceptual beliefs and judgements are perceptual demonstrative beliefs and 
judgements (see, e.g., Roessler 2009, 2011). If that were right, and if the 
commonsense psychology of perceptual demonstrative thought were radically 
mistaken—i.e. if our commonsense psychology were deeply committed to 
conscious perceptual experience playing an important explanatory role, but in 
fact conscious experience played no explanatory role at all—then notice it 
would turn out that we are quite radically mistaken in our ordinary 
understanding of how we are able to form many of our most basic non-
inferential perceptual beliefs and judgements. It would seem to us that we form 
many of our most basic non-inferential perceptual judgements at least in part 
on the basis of conscious perceptual experience of objects and their properties, 
but in fact we would form many of them solely on the basis of subterranean, 
unconscious information-processing. We might reasonably think that this 
would undermine our claims to know how we know what we know, on the 
basis of perception.  
Why think this is especially problematic or worrying? Well one reason is that if 
we were radically mistaken about the sources of many of our most basic non-
inferential perceptual beliefs, then this may lead to scepticism about perceptual 
knowledge. Of course, the idea we are mistaken about the source or basis of our 
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perceptual beliefs may not worry those who subscribe to a strongly reliabilist or 
externalist analysis of knowledge, and think knowledge is merely “a matter of 
getting yourself connected to the facts in the right way (causally, 
informationally, etc.), whether or not you know or understand that [or, 
presumably, how] you are so connected” (Dretske 1991: 82; also see, e.g., 
Papineau 1993: 144ff.). But this idea probably will worry those who think some 
awareness of or sensitivity to what one’s belief sources are is necessary for 
knowledge, and thus think that being radically mistaken about one’s belief 
sources can undermine one’s claims to know. This is not the time or place for a 
large-scale foray into perceptual epistemology. But, I suggest, the thought that 
this kind of awareness or sensitivity of beliefs sources is often required for 
knowledge—and that forming beliefs without this kind of awareness or 
sensitivity would make one somehow epistemically irrational—is not an 
unreasonable one. As such, we can see how this kind of point could form the 
basis for an argument that being committed to the idea our commonsense 
explanations of perceptual demonstrative thought are confabulations could 
lead to scepticism about perceptual knowledge.  
On the basis of these kinds of considerations we can begin to see how rejecting 
the claim that conscious perceptual experience plays an explanatory role with 
respect to our perceptual demonstrative thoughts—which, I’ve argued, crucially 
involves rejecting our commonsense psychology of perceptual demonstrative 
thought—may have some costs and unattractive consequences. And if what I 
argued in §3 is correct, this means that rejecting the reformulated version of 
Campbell’s Thesis (i.e. [CT]*) would also have these costs and unattractive 
consequences. Indeed I suggest the argument discussed in §§3-4 has the 
potential to be a strong argument for the version of Campbell’s Thesis under 
consideration in this chapter, which avoids some of the problems associated 
with Campbell’s own arguments. That said, the modest conclusion I want to 
draw here is not that our discussion demonstrates that [CT]* is true or that 
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we’ve found a complete or decisive argument for [CT]*. It would take much 
more work—and much more detailed discussion of epistemology—to turn the 
considerations discussed in this section into a complete or decisive argument 
for [CT]*. The more modest conclusion I want to draw here is only that our 
discussion reveals some of the substantial commitments someone who rejects 
[CT]* will have to take on. If my discussion in this chapter is correct, those who 
reject [CT]* will be committed to: 
(1) claiming the selective psychological antecedents to perceptual 
demonstrative thought are all unconscious information-processing 
mechanisms in perceptual cognition (see §1). 
Which I’ve argued leads to a commitment to: 
(2) denying conscious perceptual experience has any explanatory role 
with respect to our capacities to think perceptual demonstrative 
thoughts about objects (see §3). 
Which, in turn, I’ve argued leads to a commitment to: 
(3) claiming our commonsense explanations of our capacities to think 
perceptual demonstrative thoughts are confabulations and that our 
commonsense psychology of perceptual demonstrative thought is 
radically mistaken (see §4); 
Which I’ve suggested leads to a commitment to: 
(4) either: (a) scepticism about perceptual knowledge; or (b) adopting a 
strongly reliablist or externalist epistemology, such that awareness of or 
sensitivity to one’s belief sources is not necessary for knowledge, and 
such that being mistaken about one’s belief sources does not undermine 
one’s claims to know (see §4). 
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However I’ll leave open here whether or not commitment to (4) is ultimately 
problematic. This would probably require some substantial discussion of 
perceptual epistemology, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. I will also 
leave open whether there are any further problematic commitments that follow 
from (1)-(4). As such, I’ll leave open whether the development of the 
explanatory demand argument I’ve been discussing in §§3-4 of this chapter is 
ultimately successful. 
5. Final conclusions  
The main aim of this thesis has been to assess Campbell’s Thesis (i.e. [CT] and 
[CT]*)  by identifying the issues upon which the question of whether we should 
accept or reject it turns, and by revealing some of the commitments that must 
be taken on by those who wish to reject it. My main strategy has been to assess, 
develop and expand Campbell’s own arguments for [CT] and [CT]*.  
The first main claim of this thesis has been that Campbell’s own arguments are 
not entirely successful. In chapter 2 I argued that Campbell’s sea of faces 
argument is only successful if we make some substantive assumptions about the 
unity of conscious perceptual attention. If we don’t make these assumptions, I 
argued the sea of faces argument fails to give us reason to prefer Campbell’s 
Thesis to the identity view. In chapter 3 I argued that Campbell’s own 
development of the explanatory demand argument (what I called his ‘target-
setting argument’) doesn’t do enough to convince us we should accept 
Campbell’s Thesis, largely because of its reliance on Campbell’s slippery notion 
of ‘knowledge of reference’.  
The second main claim of this thesis has been that whether we should accept or 
reject Campbell’s Thesis is probably going to turn on: 
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(i) whether conscious perceptual attention is a unity in the sense 
discussed in chapter 2 (I’ve argued that if it is, then Campbell’s sea of 
faces argument is a strong argument for Campbell’s Thesis); 
(ii) whether it is acceptable to deny conscious perceptual experience of 
objects has an explanatory role with respect to our capacities to think 
perceptual demonstrative thoughts about objects (I’ve argued that those 
who reject Campbell’s Thesis will be committed to denying this).  
Further to this I argued that it’s possible to motivate the view that conscious 
perceptual attention is disunified in the sense at issue here, but also that it is 
actually an open and extremely difficult question whether or not conscious 
perceptual attention is a unified psychological phenomenon (chapter 2, §4). I 
also argued that denying conscious perceptual experience of objects has any 
explanatory role with respect to our capacities to think perceptual 
demonstrative thoughts about objects will commit one to claiming our 
commonsense psychology of perceptual demonstrative thought is radically 
mistaken. Finally I suggested that, if one wants to avoid scepticism about 
perceptual knowledge, this will also commit one to adopting a strongly 
reliablist or externalist analysis of knowledge (chapter 3, §4). 
I hope these claims do considerable work to clarify what determines whether 
we should accept or reject Campbell’s Thesis. But whether they can be turned 
into a complete and decisive argument for Campbell’s Thesis is something I 
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